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Abstract—Internet of Vehicles (IoV) is a promising branch
of the Internet of Things. IoV simulates a large variety of
crowdsourcing applications such as Waze, Uber, and Amazon
Mechanical Turk, etc. Users of these applications report the
real-time traffic information to the cloud server which trains a
machine learning model based on traffic information reported by
users for intelligent traffic management. However, crowdsourcing
application owners can easily infer users’ location information,
which raises severe location privacy concerns of the users. In
addition, as the number of vehicles increases, the frequent
communication between vehicles and the cloud server incurs
unexpected amount of communication cost. To avoid the privacy
threat and reduce the communication cost, in this paper, we
propose to integrate federated learning and local differential
privacy (LDP) to facilitate the crowdsourcing applications to
achieve the machine learning model. Specifically, we propose four
LDP mechanisms to perturb gradients generated by vehicles.
The Three-Outputs mechanism is proposed which introduces
three different output possibilities to deliver a high accuracy
when the privacy budget is small. The output possibilities of
Three-Outputs can be encoded with two bits to reduce the
communication cost. Besides, to maximize the performance when
the privacy budget is large, an optimal piecewise mechanism
(PM-OPT) is proposed. We further propose a suboptimal mech-
anism (PM-SUB) with a simple formula and comparable utility
to PM-OPT. Then, we build a novel hybrid mechanism by com-
bining Three-Outputs and PM-SUB. Finally, an LDP-FedSGD
algorithm is proposed to coordinate the cloud server and vehicles
to train the model collaboratively. Extensive experimental results
on real-world datasets validate that our proposed algorithms are
capable of protecting privacy while guaranteeing the utility.
Index Terms—Local differential privacy, Data analytic, Inter-
net of Things (IoT), Federated learning, Internet of Vehicles
(IoV).
I. INTRODUCTION
Most recently, the crowdsourcing potentiality to address
the complex problems has been expediated by the Internet
connected vehicles which are also referred as Internet of
Vehicles (IoV). Moreover, with the development of vehicular
technology, more and more such vehicles are incorporating as
participants in vehicular crowdsourcing applications. Usually,
vehicular crowdsourcing applications such as Waze, Uber, and
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Amazon Mechanical Turk gather traffic information provided
by the vehicles’ owners to support intelligent traffic manage-
ment using artificial intelligence techniques. However, sending
the spatio-temporal data such as the real-time location infor-
mation to a malicious cloud server exposes vehicle owners’
privacy to extreme vulnerabilities [1]. Because a malicious
server may track and monitor vehicle owners using provided
location information, which is a severe intrusion of privacy
of the vehicle users. In addition, a communication efficient
approach is required as the increasing vehicles incur frequent
exchange of information between vehicles and the cloud
server, which results in an unexpected challenge on the com-
munication technology. To address the aforementioned privacy
threat and improve communication efficiency, in this paper, we
propose to integrate local differential privacy (LDP) [2] and
federated learning (FL) [3] techniques.
Recently, LDP has been applied by some large companies,
for example, Apple and Google, as a practical approach for
securely sharing data. Under the LDP mechanism, users are
responsible for perturbing their data themselves with LDP
mechanisms and sending perturbed results to the aggregator.
LDP provides plausible deniability to users; thus, an adversary
cannot deduce any user’s information regardless of what prior
knowledge they have [4]. LDP mechanisms are generally used
in the data collecting step in the data analysis task. Data own-
ers are encouraged to add noise to their data before releasing
them. There are several options for releasing numeric values
under LDP: (i) the classical Laplace mechanism [5] releases
data with unbounded noise. The worst-case noise variance is
large; thus, the utility of the Laplace mechanism can be greatly
improved, as illustrated in Fig. 1. (ii) Duchi et al.’s [6] solution
perturbs and releases data in the range [−1, 1] with data outside
the input domain. It achieves a satisfactory utility when the
privacy budget ǫ < 2.3, but its utility is worse than that of
the Laplace mechanism when the privacy budget ǫ ≥ 2.3.
(iii) Wang et al. [7] propose a piecewise mechanism (PM) that
releases randomized data with infinite possibilities. The range
of outputs of their mechanism is continuous, and thus, it is
unsuitable to be encoded by vehicles. Besides, we can reduce
the worst-case noise variance through careful design.
Due to the deficiencies of existing solutions, we are mo-
tivated to explore a novel mechanism. Quan et al. [8]–[11]
propose a series of staircase mechanisms under centralized
differential privacy for optimal utility in terms of the minimum
expectation of noise amplitude and power added to the query
output considering privacy budgets ǫ→ 0 and ǫ→ +∞. They
2prove that the optimal probability density function should be
staircase-shaped in the low privacy regime (the privacy budget
ǫ is large). Kairouz et al. [12] prove that two outputs are
optimal if ǫ → 0. However, they neglect the case when the
privacy budget is a middle value. Intuitively, to obtain the
optimal performance, the number of output possibilities should
increase as ǫ increases. Duchi et al.’s [6] solution contains
two outputs, and its performance is best in the high privacy
regime (ǫ is small). As ǫ increases, a mechanism with three
outputs may have a better performance at a specific region.
Therefore, we propose Three-Outputs whose three output
possibilities can be encoded using two bits. Inspired by PM of
Wang et al. [7], we propose PM-OPT that considers two types
of probability densities to achieve a higher utility. We also
propose PM-SUB to obtain a smaller worst-case noise variance
than state-of-the-art mechanisms while maintaining a simple
formula. For ease of encoding, we discretize the continuous
range of outputs. We prove that the variance after discretiza-
tion is equal to or worse than that of the continuous case.
Furthermore, we develop a novel hybrid mechanism named
HM-TP by combining PM-SUB and Three-Outputs. After
experimenting with real-world datasets and synthetic datasets,
we confirm that our proposed mechanisms outperform existing
solutions.
Additionally, FL is an emerging privacy-preserving ap-
proach for distributed learning. Users have their own datasets
which are never uploaded to the cloud server [3]. Instead, each
user continuously performs training based on its private data,
and then it sends updates to the server to contribute to the
final machine learning model. FedSGD and FedAvg are two
commonly used FL algorithms: FedSGD enforces that gradient
updates are averaged by the server to make a gradient descent
step. While in FedAvg, users send their local model parameter
updates to the server to obtain the averaged model parameters
update for the global model. If all local users start from the
same initialization, FedSGD is equivalent to FedAvg because
averaging the gradients is strictly equivalent to averaging
the weights themselves. However, FL still introduces various
privacy concerns [13,14]; for example, adversaries can launch
attacks to recover images from a face recognition system [15].
Thus, we propose to integrate FL with local differential privacy
to enable the privacy-preserving FL training.
Contributions. Our contributions can be summarized as
follows:
• We propose four local differential privacy mecha-
nisms to defend vehicles against privacy-breaching at-
tacks. Three-Outputs has three output possibilities
and a good performance when the privacy budget is
small, whereas PM-OPT achieves a better performance
when the privacy budget is high. PM-SUB simplifies
PM-OPT while maintaining the accuracy. HM-TP com-
bines PM-SUB and Three-Outputs to obtain a higher
accuracy.
• We discretize the continuous range of outputs in our
proposed mechanisms. Through the discretization post-
processing, we enable vehicles to use our proposed mech-
anisms. In Section VIII, we confirm that the discretiza-
tion post-processing algorithm maintains utility with our
experiments, while reducing the communication cost.
• We propose a local differential privacy based federated
learning training vehicular crowdsourcing system, and an
LDP-FedSGD algorithm by taking advantage of FL and
LDP.
• Experimental evaluation of our proposed mechanisms on
real-world datasets and synthetic datasets demonstrates
that our proposed mechanisms achieve higher accuracy
in estimating the mean frequency of the data and per-
forming empirical risk minimization tasks than existing
approaches.
Organization. In the following, Section II introduces the
preliminaries. Then, we introduce related works in Section III.
Section IV shows the system model and the local differential
privacy based FederatedSGD algorithm. Section V presents the
problem formation. Section VI proposes novel solutions for
the single numerical data estimation. Section VII illustrates
proposed mechanisms used for multidimensional numerical
data estimation. Section VIII demonstrates our experimental
results. Section IX extends our proposed mechanisms to the
centralized differential privacy, and it is followed by a conclu-
sion in Section X.
II. PRELIMINARIES
In local differential privacy, users complete the perturbation
by themselves. To protect users’ privacy, each user runs a ran-
dom perturbation algorithm M, and then he sends perturbed
results to the aggregator. The privacy budget ǫ controls the
privacy-utility trade-off, and a higher privacy budget means a
lower privacy protection. As a result of this, we define local
differential privacy as follows:
Definition 1. (Local Differential Privacy.) Let M be a ran-
domized function with domain X and range Y; i.e., M maps
each element in X to a probability distribution with sample
space Y. For a non-negative ǫ, the randomized mechanism
M satisfies ǫ-local differential privacy if∣∣∣∣ ln PM[Y ∈ S|x]PM[Y ∈ S|x′]
∣∣∣∣ ≤ ǫ, ∀x, x′ ∈ X, ∀S ⊆ Y. (1)
PM[·|·] means conditional probability distribution depend-
ing on M. In local differential privacy, the random perturba-
tion is performed by users instead of a centralized aggregator.
Centralized aggregator only receives perturbed results, which
makes sure that the aggregator is unable to distinguish whether
the true tuple is x or x′ with high confidence (controlled by
the privacy budget ǫ).
III. RELATED WORK
Recently, local differential privacy has attracted much atten-
tion [16]–[22]. Several mechanisms for numeric data estima-
tion have been proposed [2,5,7,23]. (i) Dwork et al. [5] pro-
posed the Laplace mechanism which added the Laplace noise
to real one-dimensional data directly. The Laplace mechanism
was originally used in the centralized differential privacy
mechanism, and it can be applied to local differential privacy
directly. (ii) Duchi et al. [2] proposed an LDP framework that
provided output from {−C,C} where C > 1. (iii) Wang et
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Fig. 1: Different mechanisms’ worst-case noise variance for
one-dimensional numeric data versus the privacy budget ǫ.
al. [7] proposed PM which offered an output that might contain
infinite possibilities in the range of [−A,A]. In addition, they
applied LDP mechanism to preserve the privacy of gradients
generated during machine learning tasks. Both Duchi et al. [2]
and Wang et al.’s [7] approaches were extended to the case
of multidimensional numerical data.
Deficiencies of existing solutions. Fig. 1 shows that the
worst-case noise variance in the noisy value returned by
Duchi et al.’s [6] solution is smaller than that of Laplace
mechanism’s if ǫ ≤ 2.3; however, the Laplace mechanism
outperforms Duchi et al.’s [6] solution if ǫ is larger. The worst-
case noise variance in PM is smaller than that of Laplace and
Duchi et al.’s [6] solution when ǫ is large. The HM mechanism
outperforms other existing solutions by taking advantage of
Duchi et al.’s [6] solution when ǫ is small and PM when ǫ is
large. However, PM and HM’s outputs have infinite possibilities
that are hard to encode. We would like to find a mechanism
that can improve the utility of existing mechanisms. In addi-
tion, we believe there may be a mechanism that retains a high
utility and is easy to encode. Based on the above intuition, we
propose four novel mechanisms that can be used by vehicles
in Section VI.
In addition, LDP has been widely used in the research of
the IoT [24]–[28]. For example, Xu et al. [24] integrated
deep learning and local differential privacy techniques and
applied them to protect users’ privacy in edge computing. They
developed an EdgeSanitizer framework that formed a new pro-
tection layer against sensitive inference by leveraging a deep
learning model to conduct data minimization and obfuscate the
learned features with noise. Choi et al. [25] explored the fea-
sibility of applying LDP on ultra-low-power (ULP) systems.
They used resampling, thresholding, and a privacy budget con-
trol algorithm to overcome the low resolution and fixed point
nature of ULPs. He et al. [26] addressed two potential privacy
issues induced by the wireless task offloading feature of MEC,
i.e., location privacy, and usage pattern privacy, by proposing a
constrained Markov decision process (CMDP) based privacy-
aware task offloading scheduling algorithm. Their algorithm
allowed a mobile device to achieve the best possible delay
and energy consumption performance while maintaining a pre-
specified level of privacy. Li et al. [27] proposed a privacy-
preserving data aggregation scheme for MEC to assist IoT
applications with three participants, i.e., a terminal device
(TD), an edge server (ES), and a public cloud center (PCC).
TDs generated and encrypted data and sended them to the ES,
and then the ES submitted the aggregated data to the PCC. The
PCC used its private key to recover the aggregated plaintext
data. Their scheme guaranteed data privacy of the TDs and
provided source authentication and integrity. In addition, their
scheme could save half of the communication cost. To protect
the privacy of massive data generated from the IoT platforms,
Arachchige et al. [28] designed an LDP mechanism named as
LATENT for deep learning. The LATENT was implemented
by adding a randomization layer between the convolutional
module and the fully connected module to perturb data before
data left data owners for machine learning services.
Additionally, federated learning is an emerging distributed
machine learning paradigm, and it is widely used to address
data privacy problem in machine learning [3]. Recently, feder-
ated learning is explored extensively in the Internet of Things
recently [29]–[33]. Lim et al. [29] surveyed federated learning
applications in mobile edge network comprehensively, includ-
ing algorithms, applications and potential research problems,
etc. Hao et al. [30] proposed a differential enhanced feder-
ated learning (PEFL) scheme for industrial artificial industry.
They use the differential privacy mechanism to protect the
privacy of gradients, but we use a stronger privacy-preserving
mechanism (LDP) to protect each vehicle’s privacy. Moreover,
Lu et al. [31] proposed CLONE which is a collaborative
learning framework on the edges for connected vehicles, and
it reduces the training time while guaranteeing the prediction
accuracy. Different from CLONE, our proposed framework
inserts local differential privacy noises to protect the privacy of
the uploaded data. Furthermore, Fantacci et al. [32] leverage
FL to protect the privacy of mobile edge computing, while
Saputra et al. [33] applied FL to predict the energy demand
for electrical vehicle networks.
IV. SYSTEM MODEL AND THE LOCAL DIFFERENTIAL
PRIVACY BASED FEDERATEDSGD ALGORITHM
In this work, we consider a scenario where a number of
vehicles are connected with a cloud server as Fig. 2. Each
vehicle is responsible for continuously performing training and
inference locally based on data that it collects and the model
initiated by the cloud server. Local training dataset is never
uploaded to the cloud server. After finishing predefined epochs
locally, the cloud server calculates the average of uploaded
gradients from vehicles and updates the global model with
the average.
In addition, we propose a local differential privacy
based federated stochastic gradient descent algorithm
(LDP-FedSGD) for our proposed system. Details of
LDP-FedSGD are given in Algorithm 1. Unlike the FedAvg
algorithm, in the FedSGD algorithm, clients (i.e. vehicles)
upload updated gradients instead of model parameters to the
central aggregator (i.e. cloud server) [34]. However, compared
with the standard FedSGD [34], we add our proposed LDP
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Fig. 2: System Design.
mechanism proposed in Section VII to prevent the privacy
leakage of gradients. Each vehicle locally takes one step of
gradient descent on the current model using its local data, and
then it perturbs the true gradient with Algorithm 6. The server
aggregates and averages the updated gradients from vehicles
and then updates the model. To reduce the communication
rounds, we separate vehicles into groups, so that the cloud
server updates the model after gathering gradient updates
from vehicles in a group. In the following sections, we will
introduce how we obtain the LDP algorithm in detail.
Algorithm 1: Local Differential Privacy based Federat-
edSGD (LDP-FedSGD) Algorithm.
1 Server executes:
2 Server initializes the parameter as θ0;
3 for t from 1 to maximal iteration number do
4 Server sends θt−1 to users in group Gt;
5 for each user i in Group Gt do
6 UserUpdate(i, ∆L):
7 Server computes the average of the noisy gradient of
group Gt and updates the parameter from θt−1 to θt:
θt ← θt−1 − η · 1|Gt|
∑
i∈Gt A(∆L(θt−1;xi)), where
ηt is the learning rate;
8 if θt and θt−1 are close enough or these remains no
user which has not participated in the computation
then
9 break;
10 t→ t+ 1;
11 VehicleUpdate (i, ∆L):
12 Compute the (true) gradient ∆L(θt−1;xi), where xi is
user i’s data;
13 Use local differential privacy-compliant algorithm A to
compute the noisy gradient A(∆(θt−1;xi));
V. PROBLEM FORMATION
Let x be a user’s true value, and Y be the perturbed value.
Under the perturbation mechanism M, we use EM[Y |x] to
denote the expectation of the randomized output Y given input
x. VarM[Y |x] is the variance of output Y given input x.
MaxVar(M) denotes the worst-case VarM[Y |x]. We are inter-
ested in finding a privatization mechanism M that minimizes
MaxVar(M) by solving the following constraint minimization
problem:
min
M
MaxVar(M),
s.t. Eq. (1),
EM[Y |x] = x, and
PM[Y ∈ Y|x] = 1.
The second constraint illustrates that our estimator is unbiased,
and the third constraint shows the proper distribution where
Y is the range of randomized function M. In the following
sections, M is clear from the context, so that we omit the
subscript M for simplicity.
VI. MECHANISMS FOR ESTIMATION OF A SINGLE
NUMERIC ATTRIBUTE
To solve the problem in Section V, we propose four
local differential privacy mechanisms: Three-Outputs,
PM-OPT, PM-SUB, and HM-TP. Fig. 1 compares the worst-
case noise variances of existing mechanisms and our proposed
mechanisms. Three-Outputs has three discrete output pos-
sibilities, which incurs little communication cost because two
bits are enough to encode three different outputs. Moreover, it
achieves a small worst-case noise variance in the high privacy
regime (small privacy budget ǫ). However, to maintain a low
worst-case noise variance in the low privacy regime (large
privacy budget ǫ), we propose PM-OPT and PM-SUB. Both of
them achieve higher accuracies than Three-Outputs and
other existing solutions when the privacy budget ǫ is large.
Additionally, we discretize their continuous ranges of output
for vehicles to encode using a post-processing discretization
algorithm. In the following sections, we will explain our pro-
posed four mechanisms and the post-processing discretization
algorithm in detail respectively.
A. Three-Outputs Mechanism
Now, we propose a mechanism with three output possi-
bilities named as Three-Outputs which is illustrated in
Algorithm 2. Three-Outputs ensures low communication
cost while achieving a smaller worst-case noise variance than
existing solutions in the high privacy regime (small privacy
budget ǫ). Duchi et al.’s [6] solution contains two output
possibilities, and it outperforms other approaches when the
privacy budget is small. However, Kairouz et al. [12] prove
that two outputs are not always optimal as ǫ increases. By
outputting three values instead of two, Three-Outputs
improves the performance as the privacy budget increases,
which is shown in Fig. 1. When the privacy budget is small,
Three-Outputs is equivalent to Duchi et al.’s [6] solution.
For notional simplicity, given a mechanism M, we often
write PM[Y = y | X = x] as Py←x(M) below. We also
sometimes omit M to obtain P[Y = y | X = x] and Py←x.
Given a tuple x ∈ [−1, 1], Three-Outputs returns a
perturbed value Y that equals −C, 0 or C with probabilities
5Algorithm 2: Three-Outputs Mechanism for One-
Dimensional Numeric Data.
Input: tuple x ∈ [−1, 1] and privacy parameter ǫ.
Output: tuple Y ∈ {−C, 0, C}.
1 Sampling a random variable u with the probability
distribution as follows:
P [u = −1] = P−C←x,
P [u = 0] = P0←x, and
P [u = 1] = PC←x,
where P−C←x, P0←x and PC←x are given in Eq. (2),
Eq. (3) and Eq. (4).
2 if u = −1 then
3 Y = −C;
4 else if u = 0 then
5 Y = 0;
6 else
7 Y = C;
8 return Y ;
defined by
P−C←x=

1−P0←0
2 +
(
1−P0←0
2 − e
ǫ−P0←0
eǫ(eǫ+1)
)
x, if 0 ≤ x ≤ 1,
1−P0←0
2 +
(
eǫ−P0←0
eǫ+1 − 1−P0←02
)
x, if − 1 ≤ x ≤ 0,
(2)
PC←x=

1−P0←0
2 +
(
eǫ−P0←0
eǫ+1 − 1−P0←02
)
x, if 0 ≤ x ≤ 1,
1−P0←0
2 +
(
1−P0←0
2 − e
ǫ−P0←0
eǫ(eǫ+1)
)
x, if − 1 ≤ x ≤ 0,
(3)
and P0←x = P0←0 + (
P0←0
eǫ
− P0←0)x, if− 1 ≤ x ≤ 1,
(4)
where P0←0 is defined by
P0←0 :=
0, if ǫ < ln 2,
− 16 (−e2ǫ − 4eǫ − 5
+2
√
∆0 cos(
π
3 +
1
3 arccos(− ∆1
2∆
3
2
0
))), if ln 2 ≤ ǫ ≤ ǫ′,
eǫ
eǫ+2 , if ǫ > ǫ
′,
(5)
in which
∆0 := e
4ǫ + 14e3ǫ + 50e2ǫ − 2eǫ + 25, (6)
∆1 := −2e6ǫ − 42e5ǫ − 270e4ǫ − 404e3ǫ − 918e2ǫ
+ 30eǫ − 250, (7)
and ǫ′ := ln
(
3 +
√
65
2
)
≈ ln 5.53. (8)
Next, we will show how we derive the above probabil-
ities. For a mechanism which uses x ∈ [−1, 1] as the input
and only three possibilities −C, 0, C for the output value, it
satisfies
ǫ-LDP :
PC←x
PC←x′
,
P0←x
P0←x′
,
P−C←x
P−C←x′
∈ [e−ǫ, eǫ], (9a)
unbiased estimation:
C · PC←x + 0 · P0←x + (−C) · P−C←x = x, (9b)
proper distribution:
Py←x ≥ 0 and PC←x + P0←x + P−C←x = 1. (9c)
To calculate values of PC←x, P0←x and P−C←x, we use
Lemma 1 below to convert a mechanism M1 satisfying the
requirements in (9a) (9b) (9c) to a symmetric mechanismM2.
Then, we use Lemma 2 below to transform the symmetric
mechanism further toM3 whose worst-case noise variance is
smaller thanM2’s. Next, we use P0←1 to represent other prob-
abilities, and then we prove that we get the minimum variance
when P0←0 = eǫP0←1 using Lemma 3. Finally, Lemma 4
and Lemma 5 are used to obtain values for P0←0 and the
worst-case noise variance of Three-Outputs, respectively.
Thus, we can obtain values of PC←x, P0←x and P−C←x using
P0←0. In the following, we will illustrate above processes in
detail.
By symmetry, for any x ∈ [−1, 1], we enforce{
PC←x = P−C←−x, (10a)
P0←x = P0←−x, (10b)
where Eq. (10b) can be derived from Eq. (10a). The formal
justification of Eq. (10a) (10b) is given by Lemma 1 below.
Since the input domain [−1, 1] is symmetric, we can transform
any mechanism satisfying requirements in (9a) (9b) (9c) to a
symmetric mechanism while guaranteeing the worst-case noise
variance will not increase in Lemma 1. Thus, we can derive
probabilities when x ∈ [−1, 0] using probabilities when x ∈
[0, 1] based on the symmetry.
Lemma 1. For a mechanism M1 satisfying the requirements
in (9a) (9b) (9c), the following symmetrization process to
obtain a mechanism M2 will not increase (i.e., will reduce
or not change) the worst-case noise variance, while mech-
anism M2 still satisfies the requirements in (9a) (9b) (9c).
Symmetrization: For x ∈ [−1, 1],
PC←x(M2) = P−C←−x(M2) = PC←x(M1) + P−C←−x(M1)
2
,
(11)
P0←x(M2) = P0←−x(M2) = P0←x(M1) + P0←−x(M1)
2
.
(12)
Proof. The proof details are given in Appendix A of the online
full version [35] (i.e., this paper).
Based on Lemma 1, we define a symmetric mechanism as
follows.
Symmetric Mechanism. A mechanism under (9a) (9b) (9c)
is called a symmetric mechanism if it satisfies Eq. (10a) (10b).
In the following, we only consider the symmetric mechanism
M2.
Now, we design probabilities for the symmetric mechanism
M2. AsM2 satisfies the unbiased estimation which is a linear
6relationship, we set probabilities as piecewise linear functions
of x as follows:
Case 1: For x ∈ [0, 1],
PC←x = PC←0 + (PC←1 − PC←0)x, (13)
P−C←x = P−C←0 − (P−C←0 − P−C←1)x, (14)
P0←x = 1− P−C←0 − PC←0
+ (P−C←0 − PC←0 + P−C←1 − PC←1)x. (15)
Case 2: For x ∈ [−1, 0],
PC←x = PC←0 + (PC←0 − PC←−1)x, (16)
P−C←x = P−C←0 − (P−C←−1 − P−C←0)x, (17)
P0←x = 1− P−C←0 − PC←0
+ (P−C←0 − PC←0 + P−C←1 − PC←1)x. (18)
Then, we may assign values to our designed probabili-
ties above. We find that if a symmetric mechanism satisfies
Eq. (19a) and Eq. (19b), it obtains a smaller worst-case noise
variance. From Lemma 2 below, we enforce{
PC←1 = eǫPC←−1, (19a)
P−C←−1 = eǫP−C←1. (19b)
Hence, given a symmetric mechanismM2 satisfying Inequal-
ity (20), we can transform it to a new symmetric mechanism
M3 which satisfies Eq. (19a) and Eq. (19b) through processes
of Eq. (21) (22) (23) until PC←−1 = eǫP−C←1. After
transformation, the new mechanism M3 achieves a smaller
worst-case noise variance than mechanism M2. Therefore,
we use the new symmetric mechanism M3 to replace M2
in the future’s discussion. Details of transformation are in the
Lemma 2.
Lemma 2. For a symmetric mechanism M2, if
PC←1(M2) < eǫPC←−1(M2), (20)
we set a symmetric mechanism M3 as follows: For x ∈
[−1, 1],
PC←x(M3) = P−C←−x(M3)
= PC←x(M2)− e
ǫPC←−1(M2)− PC←1(M2)
eǫ − 1 , (21)
P−C←x(M3) = PC←−x(M3)
= P−C←x(M2)− e
ǫP−C←1(M2)− P−C←−1(M2)
eǫ − 1 , (22)
P0←x(M3) = 1− PC←x(M3)− P−C←x(M3)
= P0←x(M2) + 2(e
ǫPC←−1(M2)− PC←1(M2))
eǫ − 1 . (23)
Moreover, the mechanism M3 has a worst-case noise vari-
ance smaller than that of M2, while M3 still satisfies the
requirements in (9a) (9b) (9c).
Proof. The proof details are given in Appendix B of the online
full version [35] (i.e., this paper).
We have proved that the symmetric mechanism M3 has
a smaller worst-case noise variance than that of mechanism
M2 in Lemma 2, and then we use mechanism M3 to obtain
the relation between P0←1 and P0←0 to find the minimum
variance. From Lemma 3 below, we enforce
P0←0 = eǫP0←1. (24)
Then, we use the following Lemma 3 to obtain the relation
between P0←1 and P0←0, so that we can obtain PC←x, P0←x
and P−C←x using P0←0.
Lemma 3. Given P0←0, the variance of the output given
input x is a strictly decreasing function of P0←1 and hence is
minimized when P0←1 = P0←0eǫ .
Proof. The proof details are given in Appendix C of the online
full version [35] (i.e., this paper).
Lemma 3 shows that we get the minimum variance when
P0←1 = P0←0eǫ . Hence, we replace e
ǫP0←1 with P0←0. Then,
the variance is equivalent to
Var[Y |X = x]
=
(
eǫ + 1
(eǫ − 1)(1− P0←0eǫ )
)2(
1− P0←0 + (P0←0 − P0←0
eǫ
)|x|
)
− x2. (25)
Complete details for obtaining Eq. (25) are in Appendix C of
the online full version [35] (i.e., this paper).
Next, we use Lemma 4 to obtain the optimal P0←0 in
Three-Outputs to achieve the minimum worst-case vari-
ance as follows:
Lemma 4. The optimal P0←0 to minimize the
maxx∈[−1,1]Var[Y |x] is defined by Eq. (5).
Proof. The proof details are given in Appendix E of the online
full version [35] (i.e., this paper).
Remark 1. Fig. 3 displays how P0←0 changes with ǫ in
Eq. (5). When the privacy budget ǫ is small, P0←0 = 0. Thus,
Three-Outputs is equivalent to Duchi et al.’s [6] solution
when P0←0 = 0. However, as the privacy budget ǫ increases,
P0←0 increases, which means that the probability of outputting
true value increases.
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Fig. 3: Optimal P0←0 if the privacy budget ǫ ∈ [0, 8].
7By summarizing above, we obtain P−C←x, PC←x and
P0←x from Eq. (2), Eq. (3) and Eq. (4) using P0←0.
Then, we can calculate the optimal P0←0 to obtain the
minimum worst-case noise variance of Three-Outputs as
follows:
Lemma 5. The minimum worst-case noise variance of
Three-Outputs is obtained when P0←0 satisfies Eq. (5).
Proof. The proof details are given in Appendix F of the online
full version [35] (i.e., this paper).
B. PM-OPT Mechanism
Now, we advocate an optimal piecewise mechanism
(PM-OPT) as shown in Algorithm 3 to get a small worst-
case variance when the privacy budget is large. As shown
in Fig. 1, Three-Outputs’s worst-case noise variance is
smaller than PM’s when the privacy budget ǫ < 3.2. But it
loses the advantage when the privacy budget ǫ ≥ 3.2. As the
privacy budget increases, Kairouz et al. [12] suggested to send
more information using more output possibilities. Besides, we
observe that it is possible to improve Wang et al.’s [7] PM to
achieve a smaller worst-case noise variance. Thus, inspired by
them, we propose an optimal piecewise mechanism named as
PM-OPT with a smaller worst-case noise variance than PM.
Algorithm 3: PM-OPT Mechanism for One-Dimensional
Numeric Data under Local Differential Privacy.
Input: tuple x ∈ [−1, 1] and privacy parameter ǫ.
Output: tuple Y ∈ [−A,A].
1 Value t is calculated in the Eq. (30);
2 Sample u uniformly at random from [0, 1];
3 if u < e
ǫ
t+eǫ then
4 Sample Y uniformly at random from
[L(ǫ, x, t), R(ǫ, x, t)];
5 else
6 Sample Y uniformly at random from
[−A,L(ǫ, x, t)) ∪ (R(ǫ, x, t), A];
7 return Y ;
0
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Fig. 4: The probability density function F [Y = y|x] of the
randomized output Y after applying ǫ-local differential pri-
vacy.
For a true input x ∈ [−1, 1], the probability density function
of the randomized output Y ∈ [−A,A] after applying local
differential privacy is given by
F [Y = y|x]=
{
c, for y∈[L(ǫ, x, t), R(ǫ, x, t)], (26a)
d, for y∈[−A,L(ǫ, x, t)) ∪ (R(ǫ, x, t), A],(26b)
where
c =
eǫt(eǫ − 1)
2(t+ eǫ)2
, (27)
d =
t(eǫ − 1)
2(t+ eǫ)2
, (28)
A =
(eǫ + t)(t+ 1)
t(eǫ − 1) , (29)
L(ǫ, x, t) =
(eǫ + t)(xt − 1)
t(eǫ − 1) ,
R(ǫ, x, t) =
(eǫ + t)(xt + 1)
t(eǫ − 1) , and
t=

1
2
√
e2ǫ+22/3
3
√
e2ǫ−e4ǫ+
1
2
√
2e2ǫ−22/3 3
√
e2ǫ−e4ǫ + 4e
ǫ−2e3ǫ√
e2ǫ+22/3 3
√
e2ǫ−e4ǫ
− e
ǫ
2
, if ǫ < ln
√
2,
− 1
2
√
e2ǫ+22/3
3
√
e2ǫ−e4ǫ+
1
2
√
2e2ǫ−22/3 3
√
e2ǫ−e4ǫ − 4e
ǫ−2e3ǫ√
e2ǫ+22/3 3
√
e2ǫ−e4ǫ
− e
ǫ
2
, if ǫ > ln
√
2,√
3 + 2
√
3− 1√
2
, if ǫ = ln
√
2.
(30a)
(30b)
(30c)
The meaning of t can be seen from t−1t+1 =
L(ǫ,1,t)
R(ǫ,1,t) . When
the input is x = 1, the length of the higher probability density
function F [Y = y|x] = eǫt(eǫ−1)2(t+eǫ)2 is R(ǫ, 1, t) − L(ǫ, 1, t).
R(ǫ, 1, t) is the right boundary, and L(ǫ, 1, t) is the left
boundary. If 0 < t < ∞, we can derive limt→0 t−1t+1 = −1,
meaning the right boundary is opposite to the left boundary if
t is close to 0. Since limt→∞ t−1t+1 = 1, it means that the right
boundary is equal to the left boundary when t is close to ∞.
Moreover, Fig. 4 illustrates that the probability den-
sity function of Eq. (26) contains three pieces. If y ∈
[L(ǫ, x, t), R(ǫ, x, t)], the probability density function is equal
to c which is higher than other two pieces y ∈ [−A,L(ǫ, x, t))
and y ∈ (R(ǫ, x, t), A]. We calculate the probability of a
variable Y falling in the interval [L(ǫ, x, t), R(ǫ, x, t)] as
P [L(ǫ, x, t) ≤ Y ≤ R(ǫ, x, t)] = ∫ R(ǫ,x,t)L(ǫ,x,t) c dY = eǫt+eǫ .
Futhermore, we use the following lemmas to establish how
we get the value t in Eq. (26).
Lemma 6. Algorithm 3 achieves ǫ-local differential privacy.
Given an input value x, it returns a noisy value Y with
8E[Y |x] = x and
Var[Y |x] = t+ 1
eǫ − 1x
2 +
(t+ eǫ)
(
(t+ 1)3 + eǫ − 1)
3t2(eǫ − 1)2 . (31)
Proof. The proof details are given in Appendix I of the online
full version [35] (i.e., this paper).
Thus, when x = 1, we obtain the worst-case noise variance
as follows:
max
x∈[−1,1]
Var[Y |x] = t+ 1
eǫ − 1 +
(t+ eǫ)
(
(t+ 1)3 + eǫ − 1)
3t2(eǫ − 1)2 .
(32)
Then, we obtain the optimal t in Lemma 7 to minimize
Eq. (32).
Lemma 7. The optimal t for mintmaxx∈[−1,1]Var[Y |x] is
Eq. (30).
Proof. By computing the first-order derivative and second-
order derivative of mintmaxx∈[−1,1]Var[Y |x], we get the
optimal t. The proof details are given in Appendix D of the
online full version [35] (i.e., this paper).
C. PM-SUB Mechanism
We propose a suboptimal piecewise mechanism (PM-SUB)
to simplify the sophisticated computation of t in Eq. (4) of
PM-OPT, and details of PM-SUB are shown in Algorithm 4.
Algorithm 4: PM-SUB Mechanism for One-Dimensional
Numeric Data under Local Differential Privacy.
Input: tuple x ∈ [−1, 1] and privacy parameter ǫ.
Output: tuple Y ∈ [−A,A].
1 Sample u uniformly at random from [0, 1];
2 if u < e
ǫ
eǫ/3+eǫ
then
3 Sample Y uniformly at random from
[ (e
ǫ+eǫ/3)(xeǫ/3−1)
eǫ/3(eǫ−1) ,
(eǫ+eǫ/3)(xeǫ/3+1)
eǫ/3(eǫ−1) ];
4 else
5 Sample Y uniformly at random from
[−A, (eǫ+eǫ/3)(xeǫ/3−1)
eǫ/3(eǫ−1) ) ∪ (
(eǫ+eǫ/3)(xeǫ/3+1)
eǫ/3(eǫ−1) , A];
6 return Y ;
Fig. 1 illustrates that PM-OPT achieves a smaller worst-
case noise variance compared with PM, but the parameter t
for PM-OPT in Eq. (30) is complicated to compute. Some
vehicles are unable to process the complicated computation.
To make t simple for vehicles to implement, we need to find
a simple expression for it while ensuring the mechanism’s
performance. Then, we find that Wang et al.’s [7] PM is the
case when t = eǫ/2. Inspired by PM, ln t and ǫ can be linearly
related. Then, we find that ln tǫ is close to
1
3 (t for PM-OPT
in Eq. (30)), so we can set eǫ/3 as t in Eq. (26) for a new
mechanism named as PM-SUB. The probability of a variable
Y falling in the interval [L(ǫ, x, eǫ/3), R(ǫ, x, eǫ/3)] is e
ǫ
eǫ/3+eǫ
,
and we give the detail of proof in Appendix J.
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Fig. 5: PM-OPT’s worst-case noise variance versus PM-SUB’s
worst-case noise variance.
Similar to PM-OPT, we derive the worst-case noise variance
of PM-SUB from Lemma 6 with t = eǫ/3 as follows:
max
x∈[−1,1]
Var[Y |x] = 5e
4ǫ/3
3(eǫ − 1)2 +
5e2ǫ/3
3(eǫ − 1)2 +
2eǫ
(eǫ − 1)2 .
(33)
As shown in Fig. 5, PM-SUB’s worst-case noise variance is
close to PM-OPT’s, but it is smaller than PM’s, which can be
observed in Fig. 1.
D. Discretization Post-Processing
Both PM-OPT and PM-SUB’s output ranges is [−1, 1] which
is continuous, so that there are infinite output possibilities
given an input x. Thus, it is difficult to encode their outputs
for vehicles. Hence, we consider to apply a post-processing
process to discretize the continuous output range into finite
output possibilities. Algorithm 5 shows our discretization post-
processing steps.
Algorithm 5: Discretization Post-Processing.
Input: Perturbed data y ∈ [−C,C], and domain [−C,C]
is separated into 2m pieces, where m is a
positive integer.
Output: Discrete data Z .
1 Sample a Bernoulli variable u such that
P [u = 1] =
(
C · (⌊m·yC ⌋+ 1)
m
− y
)
· m
C
;
2 if u = 1 then
3 Z =
C·⌊m·yC ⌋
m ;
4 else
5 Z =
C·(⌊m·yC ⌋+1)
m ;
6 return Z;
The idea of Algorithm 5 is as follows. We discretize the
range of output into 2m parts due to the symmetric range
[−C,C], and then we obtain 2m + 1 output possibilities.
9After we get a perturbed data y, it will fall into one of 2m
segments. Then, we categorize it to the left boundary or the
right boundary of the segment, which resembles sampling a
Bernoulli variable.
Next, we explain how we derive probabilities for the
Bernoulli variable. Let the original input be x. A random
variable Y represents the intermediate output after the per-
turbation and a random variable Z represents the output after
the discretization. The range of Y is [−C,C]. Because the
range of output is symmetric with respect to 0, we discretize
both [−C, 0] and [0, C] into m parts, where the value of m
depends on the user’ requirement. Thus, we discretize Y to Z
to take only the following (2m+ 1) values:{
i× C
m
: integer i ∈ {−m,−m+ 1, . . . ,m}
}
. (34)
When Y is instantiated as y ∈ [−C,C], we have the following
two cases:
① If y is one of the above (2m+1) values, we set Z as y.
② If y is not one of the above (2m + 1) values, and then
there exist some integer k ∈ {−m,−m+ 1, . . . ,m− 1}
such that kCm < y <
(k+1)C
m . In fact, this gives k <
ym
C <
k+1, so we can set k := ⌊ ymC ⌋. Then conditioning on that
Y is instantiated as y, we set Z as kCm with probability
k + 1 − ymC and as (k+1)Cm with probability ymC − k, so
that the expectation of Z given Y = y equals y (as we
will show in Eq. (146), this ensures that the expectation
of Z given the original input as x equals x).
The following Lemma 8 shows the probability distribution
of assigning y with a boundary value in the second case above
when the intermediate output y is not one of discrete (2m+1)
values.
Lemma 8. After we obtain the intermediate output y after
perturbation, we discretize it to a random variable Z equal to
kC
m or
(k+1)C
m with the following probabilities:
P [Z = z | Y = y] =
k + 1−
ym
C , if z =
kC
m ,
ym
C − k, if z = (k+1)Cm .
(35)
Proof. The proof details are given in Appendix K of the online
full version [35] (i.e., this paper).
After discretization, the worst-case noise variance does not
change or get worse proved by Lemma 9 as follows:
Lemma 9. Let local differential privacy mechanism be Mech-
anism M1, and discretization algorithm be Mechanism M2.
Let all of output possibilities of Mechanism M1 be S1, and
output possibilities of MechanismM2 be S2. S2 ⊂ S1. When
given input x, M1 and M2 are unbiased. The worst-case
noise variance of Mechanism M2 is greater than or equal to
the worst-case noise variance of Mechanism M1.
Proof. The proof details are given in Appendix L of the online
full version [35] (i.e., this paper).
E. HM-TP Mechanism
Fig. 1 shows that Three-Outputs outperforms PM-SUB
when the privacy budget ǫ is small, whereas PM-SUB
achieves a smaller variance if the privacy budget ǫ is large.
To fully take advantage of two mechanisms, we combine
Three-Outputs and PM-SUB to create a new hybrid
mechanism named as HM-TP. Fig. 1 illustrates that HM-TP
obtains a lower worst-case noise variance than other solutions.
Hence, HM-TP invokes PM-SUB with probability β. Oth-
erwise, it invokes Three-Outputs. We define the noisy
variance of HM-TP as VarH[Y |x] given inputs x as follows:
VarH[Y |x] = β · VarP [Y |x] + (1− β) · VarT [Y |x],
where VarP [Y |x] and VarT [Y |x] denote noisy outputs’ vari-
ances incurred by PM-SUB and Three-Outputs, respec-
tively. The following lemma presents the value of β:
Lemma 10. The maxx∈[−1,1]VarH[Y |x] is minimized when β
is Eq. (151). Due to the complicated equation of β, we put it
in the appendix.
Proof. The proof details are given in AppendixM of the online
full version [35] (i.e., this paper).
Since we have obtained the probability β, we can calculate
the exact expression for the worst-case noise variance in
Lemma 11 as follows:
Lemma 11. If β satisfies Lemma 10, we obtain the worst-case
noise variance of HM-TP as
max
x∈[−1,1]
VarH[Y |x] ={
VarH[Y |x∗], if 0 < β < 2(e
ǫ−a)2(eǫ−1)−aeǫ(eǫ+1)2
2(eǫ−a)2(eǫ+t)−aeǫ(eǫ+1)2 ,
max{VarH[Y |0],VarH[Y |1]}, otherwise,
where x∗ := (β−1)ae
ǫ(eǫ+1)2
2(eǫ−a)2(β(eǫ+t)−eǫ+1) and a = P0←0 which is
defined in Eq. (5).
Proof. The proof details are given in Appendix U of the online
full version [35] (i.e., this paper).
VII. MECHANISMS FOR ESTIMATION OF MULTIPLE
NUMERIC ATTRIBUTES
Now, we consider a case in which the user’s data record
contains d > 1 attributes. There are three existing solu-
tions to collect multiple attributes: (i) The straightforward
approach which collects each attribute with privacy budget
ǫ/d. Based on the composition theorem [36], it satisfies ǫ-
LDP after collecting of all attributes. But the added noise can
be excessive if d is large [7]. (ii) Duchi et al.’ [6] solution,
which is rather complicated, handles numeric attributes only.
(iii) Wang et al.’s [7] solution is the advanced approach
that deals with a data tuple containing both numeric and
categorical attributes. Their algorithm requires to calculate an
optimal k < d based on the single dimensional attribute’s ǫ-
LDP mechanism, and a user submits selected k dimensional
attributes instead of d dimensions.
Thus, we follow Wang et al.’s [7] idea to extend Sec-
tion VI to the case of multidimensional attributes. Algorithm 6
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Algorithm 6: Mechanism for Multiple-Dimensional Nu-
meric Attributes.
Input: tuple x ∈ [−1, 1]d and privacy parameter ǫ.
Output: tuple Y ∈ [−A,A]d.
1 Let Y =< 0, 0, . . . , 0 >;
2 Let k = max{1,min{d,
⌊
ǫ
2.5
⌋
}};
3 Sample k values uniformly without replacement from
{1, 2, . . . , d};
4 for each sampled value j do
5 Feed x[tj ] and
ǫ
k as input to PM-SUB,
Three-Outputs or HM-TP, and obtain a noisy
value yj ;
6 Y [tj ] =
d
kyj ;
7 return Y ;
shows the pseudo-code of our extension for our PM-SUB,
Three-Outputs, and HM-TP. Given a tuple x ∈ [−1, 1]d,
the algorithm returns a perturbed tuple Y that has non-zero
value on k attributes, where
k = max{1,min{d,
⌊ ǫ
2.5
⌋
}}, (36)
and Appendix S of the online full version [35] (i.e., this paper)
proves our selected k is optimal after extending PM-SUB,
Three-Outputs, and HM-TP to support d dimensional
attributes.
Overall, our algorithm for collecting multiple attributes
outperforms existing solutions, which is confirmed by our
experiments in the Section VIII. But Three-Outputs uses
only one more bit compared with Duchi et al.’s [6] solution
to encode outputs. Moreover, our Three-Outputs obtains a
higher accuracy in the high privacy regime (where the privacy
budget is small) and saves many bits for encoding since PM and
HM’s continuous output range requires infinite bits to encode,
whereas PM-SUB and HM-TP’s advantages are obvious at
a large privacy budget. Furthermore, because vehicles can
not encode continuous range, we discretize the continuous
range of outputs to discrete outputs. Our experiments in
Section VIII-C confirm that we can achieve similar results
to algorithms before discretizing by carefully designing the
number of discrete parts. Hence, our proposed algorithms are
obviously more suitable for vehicles than existing solutions.
Intuitively, Algorithm 6 requires every user to submit k
attributes instead of d attributes, such that the privacy budget
for each attribute increases from ǫ/d to ǫ/k, which helps
to minimize the noisy variance. In addition, by setting k
as Eq. (36), algorithm 6 achieves an asymptotically optimal
performance while preserving privacy, which we will prove
using Lemma 12 and 13. Lemma 12 and 13 are proved in the
same way as that of Lemma 4 and 5 in [7].
Lemma 12. Algorithm 6 satisfies ǫ-local differential privacy.
In addition, given an input tuple x, it outputs a noisy tuple Y ,
such that for any j ∈ [1, d], and each tj of those k attributes
is selected uniformly at random (without replacement) from
all d attributes of x, and then E[Y [tj ]] = x[tj ].
Proof. Algorithm 6 composes k numbers of ǫ-LDP pertur-
bation algorithms; thus, based on composition theorem of
differential mechanism [37], Algorithm 6 satisfies ǫ-LDP. As
we can see from Algorithm 6, each perturbed output Y equals
to dkyj with probability
k
d or equals to 0 with probability 1− kd .
Thus, E[Y [tj ]] =
k
d · E[ dk · yj ] = E[yj ] = x[tj ] holds.
Lemma 13. For any j ∈ [1, d], let Z[tj] = 1n
∑n
i=1 Y [tj ] and
X [tj] =
1
n
∑n
i=1 x[tj ]. With at least 1− β probability,
max
j∈[1,d]
|Z[tj ]−X [tj]| = O
(√
d ln(d/β))
ǫ
√
n
)
.
Proof. The proof details are given in Appendix R of the online
full version [35] (i.e., this paper).
VIII. EXPERIMENTS
We implemented both existing solutions and our proposed
solutions, including PM-SUB, Three-Outputs, HM-TP
proposed by us, PM and HM proposed by Wang et al. [7],
Duchi et al.’s [6] solution and the traditional Laplace mech-
anism. Our datasets include the following: (i) the WISDM
Human Activity Recognition dataset [38], which is a set of
accelerometer data on an Android phone from 35 subjects
performing 6 activities, where the domain of the timestamps
of the phone’s uptime is removed from the dataset, and the
remaining 3 numeric attributes are accelerations in x, y, and
z directions measured by the Android phone’s accelerometer
and 2 categorical attributes; and (ii) two public datasets
extracted from Integrated Public Use Microdata Series [39]
which contain census records from Brazil (BR) and Mexico
(MX). BR contains 4M tuples and 16 attributes, of which
6 are numerical and 10 are categorical. MX contains 4M
records and 19 attributes, of which 5 are numerical and 14
are categorical. We normalize the domain of each numeric
attribute to [−1, 1]. In our experiments, we report average
results over 100 runs.
A. Results on the Mean Values of Numeric Attributes
We estimate the mean of each numeric attribute by col-
lecting a noisy multidimensional tuple from each user. For
comparison with Wang et al.’s [7] mechanisms, we follow
their experiments and then split the total privacy budget ǫ into
two parts. Assume a tuple contains d attributes which include
dn numeric attributes and dc categorical attributes. Then, we
allocate dnǫ/d budget to numeric attributes, and dcǫ/d to
categorical ones, respectively. We estimate the mean value
for each of the numeric attributes using existing methods:
(i) Duchi et al.’s [6] solution which directly handles multiple
numeric attributes; (ii) the Laplace mechanism, which applies
to each numeric attribute individually with ǫ/d budget; (iii)
PM and HM from Wang et al. [7]. We measure the mean
square error (MSE) of the estimated mean values for numeric
attributes using our proposed approaches in Section VII. Fig. 6
presents MSE results as a function of the total budget of ǫ in
the datasets (WISDM, MX and BR). Overall, our experimental
evaluation shows that our proposed approaches outperform
existing solutions. HM-TP outperforms existing solutions in all
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Fig. 8: Logistic Regression.
settings, whereas PM-SUB’s MSE is smaller than PM’s when
privacy budget ǫ is large such as 4, and Three-Outputs’s
performance is better at a small privacy budget. Hence, exper-
imental results are in accordance with our theories.
We also run a set of experiments on synthetic datasets
that contain numeric attributes only. We create four synthetic
datasets, including 16 numeric attributes where each attribute
value is generated from a Gaussian distribution with mean
value u ∈ {0, 13 , 23 , 1} and standard deviation of 14 . By
evaluating the MSE in estimating mean values of numeric
attributes with our proposed mechanisms, we present our ex-
perimental results in Fig. 7. Hereby, we confirm that PM-SUB,
Three-Outputs and HM-TP outperform existing solutions.
B. Results on Empirical Risk Minimization
In this set of experiments, we evaluate the proposed al-
gorithms’ performance using linear regression, logistic regres-
sion, and SVM classification tasks. Since both the BR and MX
datasets contain the “total income” attribute, we use it as the
dependent variable and consider other attributes as indepen-
dent variables. We transform each categorical attribute tj with
k values into k − 1 binary attributes with a domain {−1, 1},
such that (i) the l-th (l < k) value in tj is represented by 1
on the l-th binary attribute and −1 on each of the remaining
k−2 attributes; (ii) the k-th value in tj is represented by −1 on
all binary attributes. After this transformation, the dimension
of WISDN is 43, and BR (resp. MX) is 90 (resp. 94). For
the BR and MX datasets, we consider the numeric attribute
“total income” as the dependent variable and other attributes
12
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Fig. 9: Support Vector Machines.
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Fig. 11: Result accuracy for mean estimation with discretization post processing on PM, HM, and HM-TP.
as independent variables, respectively.
Consider each tuple of data as the dataset of a vehicle, so
vehicles calculate gradients and run different LDP mechanisms
to generate noisy gradients. Each mini-batch is a group of
vehicles. Thus, the centralized aggregator i.e. cloud server
updates the model after each group of vehicles send noisy
gradients. The experiment involves 8 competitors: PM-SUB,
Three-Outputs, HM-TP, PM, HM, Duchi et al.’s solution,
Laplace and a non-private setting. We set the regularization
factor λ = 10−4 in all approaches. In each dataset, we use
10-fold cross-validation 5 times to assess the performance
of each method. Fig. 8 and Fig. 9 show that the proposed
mechanisms (PM-SUB, Three-Outputs, and HM-TP) have
lower misclassification rates than other mechanisms. Fig. 10
shows the MSE of the linear regression model. We ignore
Laplace’s result because its MSE clearly exceeds those of other
mechanisms. In the selected privacy budgets, our proposed
mechanisms (PM-SUB, Three-Outputs, and HM-TP) out-
perform existing approaches (PM, HM, Duchi et al.’s solution,
and Laplace).
C. Results after Discretization
In this section, we add a discretization post processing
step in Algorithm 5 to the implementation of mechanisms
with continuous range of outputs, including PM, PM-SUB,
HM and HM-TP. To confirm that the discretization is effec-
tive, we perform the following experiments. We separate the
output domain [−C,C] into 2000 segments, and then we
have 2001 possible outputs given an initial input x. We add
a discretization step to the experiments in Section VIII-A.
Fig. 11 displays our experimental results. We confirm that
our proposed approaches outperform existing solutions in
estimating the mean value using three real-world datasets:
WISDM, MX, and BR after discretizing.
In addition, we use log regression and linear regression to
evaluate the performance after discretization. We repeat the
experiments in Section VIII-B with an additional discretiza-
tion post processing step. Fig. 12 and Fig. 13 present our
experimental results. Compared with other approaches, the
performance is similar to that before discretizing. Furthermore,
Fig. 14 illustrates how the accuracy changes as output possi-
bilities increase. It shows that the misclassification rate of the
13
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Fig. 12: Linear Regression with discretization post processing on PM, HM, and HM-TP (privacy parameter ǫ = 4).
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Fig. 13: Logistic Regression with discretization post processing on PM, HM, and HM-TP (privacy budget ǫ = 4).
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Fig. 15: Support Vector Machine with discretization post
processing on PM, HM, and HM-TP (privacy budget ǫ = 5).
logistic regression task and the MSE of the linear regression
task are related to the size of output possibilities. Although
incurring with randomness, we find that the misclassification
rate and MSE decrease as the number of output possibili-
ties increases. When there are three output possibilities, it
incurs randomness. Moreover, Fig. 15 shows that PM-SUB
outperforms Three-Outputs, when the number of output
possibilities is large. However, when we discretize the range
of outputs into 2000 segments, the performance is satisfactory
and similar to the performance with a continuous range of
outputs. Hence, our proposed approaches combined with the
discretization step help retain the performance while enabling
the usage in vehicles.
IX. DISCUSSION
A. Apply PM-OPT and PM-SUB to centralized differential
privacy
Neighboring databases. Centralized differential privacy
(DP) contains bounded DP and unbounded DP [40]. In
bounded DP, database D1 can be obtained from database D2
by changing the value of exactly one tuple [5]. In unbounded
DP, we can obtain database D1 and D2 one from the other by
adding or removing one record (i.e. one tuple) [41].
We prove that PM-OPT and PM-SUB also satisfy centralized
differential privacy’ requirements in Theorem 1, 2.
Theorem 1. PM-OPT satisfies centralized differential privacy
constraints.
Proof. Given a query function Q : D → R performed on
two neighbour datasets D1 and D2, let Qmax and Qmin be the
maximal and minimum query result over all possible outputs
respectively, we have x := 2·Q(D1)−(Qmax+Qmin)Qmax−Qmin ∈ [−1, 1] and
14
x′ := 2·Q(D2)−(Qmax+Qmin)Qmax−Qmin ∈ [−1, 1]. After applying PM-OPT,
we get noisy value Y . Let Y := 2·Q˜(x)−(Qmax+Qmin)Qmax−Qmin and Y
′ :=
2·Q˜(x′)−(Qmax+Qmin)
Qmax−Qmin , so that we have
F
[
Q˜(x) ∈ S
]
F
[
Q˜(x′) ∈ S
] ≤ c
d
= exp(ǫ), (37)
where S = [−A,A]. c, d are in Eq. (27) and Eq. (28),
respectively.
Theorem 2. PM-SUB achieves ǫ-differential privacy.
Proof. Omitted because it is similar to Theorem 1.
B. A clarification about Three-Outputs ver-
sus Four-Outputs
One may wonder why we consider a perturbation mecha-
nism with three outputs (i.e., our Three-Outputs) instead
of a perturbation mechanism with four outputs (referred to as
Four-Outputs), since using two bits to encode the output
of a perturbation mechanism can represent four outputs. The
reason is as follows. The approach to design Four-Outputs
is similar to that for Three-Outputs, but the detailed
analysis for Four-Outputs will be even more tedious than
that for Three-Outputs (which is already quite complex).
Given above reasons, we elaborate Three-Outputs but not
Four-Outputs in this paper.
X. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we propose PM-OPT, PM-SUB,
Three-Outputs and HM-TP local differential privacy
mechanisms. These mechanisms effectively preserve the
privacy when collecting data records and computing accurate
statistics in various data analysis tasks, including estimating
the mean frequency and complex machine learning tasks
such as linear regression, logistic regression, and SVM
classification. Moreover, we integrate our proposed local
differential privacy mechanisms with FedSGD algorithm
to create an LDP-FedSGD algorithm. The LDP-FedSGD
algorithm enables the vehicular crowdsourcing applications
to train a machine learning model to predict the traffic
status while avoiding the privacy threat and reducing the
communication cost. More specifically, by leveraging LDP
mechanisms, adversaries are unable to deduce the exact
location information of vehicles from uploaded gradients.
Then, FL enables vehicles to train their local machine
learning models using collected data and then send noisy
gradients instead of data to the cloud server to obtain a global
model. Extensive experiments demonstrate that our proposed
approaches are effective and able to perform better than
existing solutions. Further, we intend to apply our proposed
LDP mechanisms to deep neural network to deal with more
complex data analysis tasks.
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APPENDIX
A. Proof of Lemma 1
The mechanism M2 satisfies the proper distribution in
Eq. (9c) because of
PC←x(M2) + P−C←x(M2) + P0←x(M2)
=
PC←x(M1) + P−C←−x(M1)
2
+
P−C←x(M1) + PC←−x(M1)
2
+
P0←x(M1) + P0←−x(M1)
2
= 1.
Besides, the mechanism M2 satisfies unbiased estimation in
Eq. (9b) because
C · PC←x(M2) + (−C) · P−C←x(M2) + 0 · P0←x(M2)
= C · PC←x(M1) + P−C←−x(M1)
2
+ (−C) · P−C←x(M1) + PC←−x(M1)
2
+ 0 · P0←x(M1) + P0←−x(M1)
2
= x.
In addition,
PC←x(M2)
PC←x′(M2) =
PC←x(M1) + P−C←−x(M1)
PC←x′(M1) + P−C←−x′(M1) (38)
and
P−C←x(M2)
P−C←x′(M2) =
P−C←x(M1) + PC←−x(M1)
P−C←x′(M1) + PC←−x′(M1) (39)
and
P0←x(M2)
P0←x′(M2) =
P0←x(M1) + P0←−x(M1)
P0←x′(M1) + P0←−x′(M1) . (40)
According to (9a), we obtain
e−ǫ(PC←x′(M1) + P−C←−x′(M1))
PC←x′(M1) + P−C←−x′(M1)
≤ Eq. (38) ≤ e
ǫ(PC←x′(M1) + P−C←−x′(M1))
PC←x′(M1) + P−C←−x′(M1) ,
which is equavalent to
e−ǫ ≤ Eq. (38) ≤ eǫ. (41)
Similarly, we prove that Eq. (39) (40) satisfy (9a). Hence, we
conclude that M2 satisfies ǫ-LDP requirements.
Then, we prove that the symmetrization process does not
increase the worst-case noise variance as follows:
Since M2 satisfies the unbiased estimation of Eq. (9b),
E[Y |X = x] = x. Hence, the variance of mechanism M2
given x is
VarM2 [Y |X = x] = E[Y 2|X = x]− (E[Y |X = x])2
= C2 · PC←x(M2) + 0 · PC←x(M2)
+ (−C)2 · P−C←x(M2)− x2
= C2(1− P0←x(M2))− x2 (42)
= C2
(
1− P0←x(M1) + P0←−x(M1)
2
)
− x2, (43)
or it changes to
VarM2 [Y |X = −x] = E[Y 2|X = −x]− (E[Y |X = −x])2
= C2 · PC←−x(M2) + 0 · PC←−x(M2)
+ (−C)2 · P−C←−x(M2)− x2
= C2(1 − P0←−x(M2))− x2 (44)
= C2
(
1− P0←x(M1) + P0←−x(M1)
2
)
− x2, (45)
when given −x.
The variance of mechanism M1 is
VarM1 [Y |X = x] = E[Y 2|X = x]− (E[Y |X = x])2
= C2 · PC←x(M1) + 0 · PC←x(M1)
+ (−C)2 · P−C←x(M1)− x2
= C2(1 − P0←x(M1))− x2, (46)
or
VarM1 [Y |X = −x] = E[Y 2|X = −x]− (E[Y |X = −x])2
= C2 · PC←−x(M1) + 0 · PC←−x(M1)
+ (−C)2 · P−C←−x(M1)− x2
= C2(1 − P0←−x(M1))− x2. (47)
Hence,
VarM2 [Y |X = x] = VarM2 [Y |X = −x]
=
VarM2 [Y |X = x] + VarM2 [Y |X = −x]
2
(48)
=
Eq. (46) + Eq. (47)
2
≤ Max{VarM1 [Y |X = −x],VarM1 [Y |X = x]}.

B. Proof of Lemma 2
In essence, with Eq. (21) (21), we have
PC←1(M3)
PC←−1(M3)
=
PC←1(M2)− e
ǫPC←−1(M2)−PC←1(M2)
eǫ−1
PC←−1(M2)− eǫPC←−1(M2)−PC←1(M2)eǫ−1
= eǫ.
Similarly, we can prove that
PC←1(M3)
PC←−1(M3) ,
PC←1(M3)
PC←−1(M3) = e
ǫ.
Besides,
PC←x + P−C←x + P0←x = 1.
In addition,
C · PC←x + (−C) · P−C←x + 0 · P0←x
= C · (PC←x(M2)− P−C←x(M2)) = x.
Hence, mechanismM3 satisfies requirements in (9a) (9b) (9c).
Because the symmetric mechanism M3 satisfies require-
ments in (9a) (9b) (9c), the variance of M3 is
VarM3 [Y |X = x] = E[Y 2|X = x]− (E[Y |X = x])2
= C2 · PC←x(M3) + 0 · PC←x(M3)
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+ (−C)2 · P−C←x(M3)− x2
= C2(PC←x(M3) + P−C←x(M3))− x2
= C2(1− P0←x(M3))− x2.
By comparing with variance of M2 in Eq. (42), we obtain
VarM3 [Y |X = x]− VarM2 [Y |X = x]
= C2(1− P0←x(M3))− x2 − (C2(1− P0←x(M2))− x2)
= C2(P0←x(M2)− P0←x(M3)).
Because of P0←x(M2) > P0←x(M3), based on Eq. (23)
and Inequality (20), we get P0←x(M2) > P0←x(M3) which
means that
VarM2 [Y |X = x] > VarM3 [Y |X = x].
Thus, the variance of M3 is smaller than the variance ofM2
when x ∈ [−1, 1], so we obtain that the worst-case noise
variance of M3 is smaller that of M2 using
max
x∈[−1,1]
VarM2 [Y |X = x] > max
x∈[−1,1]
VarM3 [Y |X = x].

C. Proof of Lemma 3
Since P−C←0+PC←0+P0←0 = 1 and unbiased estimation
−C · P−C←0 + C · PC←0 + 0 · P0←0 = 0, we have
PC←0 = P−C←0 =
1− P0←0
2
. (49)
Then, based on (9a) (9b) (9c) and Lemma 2, we can derive C
with the following steps:
P−C←1 + PC←1 + P0←1 = 1,
− C · P−C←1 + C · PC←1 + 0 · P0←1 = 1.
Therefore, we have
PC←1 =
1− P0←1 + 1C
2
,
P−C←1 =
1− P0←1 − 1C
2
.
From Lemma 2, we obtain
1− P0←1 + 1C
2
= eǫ ·
(
1− P0←1 − 1C
2
)
,
which is equivalent to
C =
eǫ + 1
(eǫ − 1)(1− P0←1) . (50)
Hence,
PC←1 = P−C←−1 =
(1− P0←1)eǫ
eǫ + 1
,
P−C←1 = PC←−1 =
(1− P0←1)
eǫ + 1
. (51)
Then, we compute the variance as follows:
I. For x ∈ [0, 1], we have
Var[Y |X = x] = E[Y 2|X = x]− (E[Y |X = x])2
= C2 · PC←x + 0 · P0←x + (−C)2 · P−C←x − x2
= C2 (PC←x + P−C←x)− x2. (52)
Substituting Eq. (13) and Eq. (14) into Eq. (52) yields
= C2 (PC←0 + (PC←1 − PC←0)x)
+ C2 (P−C←0 − (P−C←0 − P−C←1)x) − x2
= C2 (PC←0 + P−C←0) + C2(PC←1 + PC←−1)x
− C2(PC←0 + P−C←0)x− x2
= C2 (PC←0 + P−C←0) + C2(1− P0←1)x
− C2(1− P0←0)x− x2
= C2 (1− P0←0) + C2(P0←0 − P0←1)x− x2. (53)
II. For x ∈ [−1, 0], we have
Var[Y |X = x] = E[Y 2|X = x]− (E[Y |X = x])2
= C2 (1− P0←0) + C2(P0←0 − P0←1)(−x) − x2.
(54)
Hence, by summarizing Eq. (50), Eq. (53), and Eq. (54), we
get the variance as follows:
Var[Y |X = x]
= C2 (1− P0←0) + C2(P0←0 − P0←1)|x| − x2
=
(
eǫ + 1
(eǫ − 1)(1− P0←1)
)2
(1− P0←0 + (P0←0 − P0←1)|x|)
− x2. (55)
Derive the partial derivative of Var[Y |X = x] to P0←1, and
we get
d(Var[Y |X = x])
dP0←1
=
(eǫ + 1)2 (2P0←0 + |x|(1 − 2P0←0 + P0←1)− 2)
(P0←1 + 1)2(eǫ − 1)2 . (56)
Then, we have the following cases:
I. If |x| = 0, Eq. (56) = (eǫ+1)2(2P0←0−2)(P0←1+1)2(eǫ−1)2 < 0,
II. If |x| = 1, Eq. (56) = (eǫ+1)2(P0←1−1)(P0←1+1)2(eǫ−1)2 < 0.
Therefore, if given P0←0, the variance of the output given
input x is a strictly decreasing function of P0←1. Hence, we
get the minimized variance when P0←1 = P0←0eǫ . 
D. Solve Eq. (59)
To find the optimal t for mintmaxx∈[−1,1]Var[Y |x], we
calculate first-order derivative of the maxx∈[−1,1]Var[Y |x] as
follows:
2t
3(eǫ − 1)2 +
4
3(eǫ − 1) +
4
3(eǫ − 1)2 −
4t−2
3(eǫ − 1)2
− 4t
−2
3(eǫ − 1) −
2t−3
3(eǫ − 1)2 −
4t−3
3(eǫ − 1) −
2t−3
3
=
2
3(eǫ − 1)2 [t+ 2e
ǫ − 2eǫt−2 − e2ǫt−3]. (57)
Next, we calculate the second-order derivative of
maxx∈[−1,1]Var[Y |x] as follows:
2
3(eǫ − 1)2 [1 + 4e
ǫt−3 + 3eǫt−4] > 0. (58)
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Since the second-order derivative of maxx∈[−1,1]Var[Y |x] >
0, we can conclude that maxx∈[−1,1]Var[Y |x] has minimum
point in its domain.
To find t which minimizes maxx∈[−1,1]Var[Y |x], we set
t4 + 2eǫt3 − 2eǫt− e2ǫ = 0. By solving
t4 + 2eǫt3 − 2eǫt− e2ǫ = 0, (59)
we obtain Eq. (30). Define Eq. (59)’s coefficients as c4 :=
1, c3 := 2e
ǫ, c2 := 0, c1 := −2eǫ, c0 := −e2ǫ, and we
obtain
c4 · t4 + c3 · t3 + c1 · t+ c0 = 0. (60)
To change Eq. (60) into a depressed quartic form, we substitute
f := eǫ, t := y − c34c4 = y −
f
2 into Eq. (60) and obtain
y4 + p · y2 + q · y + r = 0, (61)
where
p =
8c2c4 − 3c23
8c24
= −3f
2
2
, (62)
q =
c33 − 4c2c3c4 + 8c1c24
8c34
= f3 − 2f, (63)
r =
−3c43 + 256c0c34 − 64c1c3c24 + 16c2c23c4
256c44
= − 3
16
f4. (64)
Rewrite Eq. (61) to the following:(
y2 +
p
2
)
= −qy − r + p
2
4
. (65)
Then, we introduce a variable m into the factor on the left-
hand side of Eq. (65) by adding 2y2m + pm + m2 to both
sides. Thus, we can change the equation to the following:(
y2 +
p
2
+m
)
= 2my2 − qy +m2 +mp+ p
2
4
− r. (66)
Since m is arbitrarily chosen, we choose the value of m to
get a perfect square in the right-hand side. Hence,
8m3 + 8pm2 + (2p2 − 8r)m− q2 = 0. (67)
To solve Eq. (67), we substitute Eq. (62), Eq. (63) and Eq. (64)
into the following equations:
c′3 := 8,
c′2 := 8p,
c′1 := 2p
2 − 8r,
c′0 := −q2,
∆0 = (c
′
2)
2 − 3c′3c′1 = (8p)2 − 3 · 8 · (2p2 − 8r) = 0,
∆1 = 2(c
′
2)
2 − 9c′3 · c′2 · c′1 + 27(c′3)2 · c′0
= 2(8p)3 − 9 · 8 · 8p · (2p2 − 8r) + 27 · 82 · (−q2)
= 6912(f4 − f2),
C =
3
√
∆1 ±
√
∆21 − 4∆30
2
= 3
√
∆1
= 3
√
6912(f4 − f2). (68)
By solving the cubic function Eq. (68), we have roots as
follows :
mk = − 1
3c′3
(c′2 + ξ
kC +
∆0
ξkC
)
=
f2
2
+
3
√
f2 − f4
2
ξk, k ∈ 0, 1, 2. (69)
We only use the real-value root; thus, we get
m =
f2
2
+
3
√
f2 − f4
2
. (70)
Thus,
y =
±1
√
2m±2
√
−(2p+ 2m±1
√
2q√
m
)
2
. (71)
Then, the solutions of the original quartic equation are
t = − c3
4c4
+
±1
√
2m±2
√
−(2p+ 2m±1
√
2q√
m
)
2
. (72)
Since t is a real number and t > 0, we obtain Eq. (30) after
substituting c3, c4,m, p, q, f into Eq. (72). 
E. Proof of Lemma 4
By summarizing Lemma 1 2 3, our designed mechanism
achieves minimum variance when it satisfies P0←1 = P0←0eǫ .
Hence, the variance is
Var[Y |X = x] = C2 (1− P0←0) + C2P0←0(1− 1
eǫ
)|x| − x2,
(73)
where
C =
eǫ + 1
(eǫ − 1)(1− P0←0eǫ )
. (74)
For simplicity, we set
a = P0←0, (75)
b = P0←0(1 − 1
eǫ
) = a(1− 1
eǫ
). (76)
Since x ∈ [−1, 1], the worst-case noise variance is
max
x∈[−1,1]
Var[Y |x] =
{
(1− a)C2 + C4b24 , if C
2b
2 < 1,
(1− a+ b)C2 − 1, if C2b2 ≥ 1.
(77)
Substituting Eq. (75), Eq. (76) and Eq. (74) into Eq. (77)
yields
max
x∈[−1,1]
Var[Y |x]
=

(eǫ+1)2·e2ǫ
(eǫ−1)2
(
1−a
(eǫ−a)2 +
(eǫ+1)2·a2
4(eǫ−a)4
)
, if C
2b
2 < 1,
(eǫ+1)2·e2ǫ
(eǫ−1)2
(
1−a
(eǫ−a)2 +
(eǫ−1)·a
eǫ(eǫ−a)2
)
−1,if C2b2 ≥ 1.
=

(eǫ+1)2·e2ǫ
(eǫ−1)2
(
1−a
(eǫ−a)2 +
(eǫ+1)2·a2
4(eǫ−a)4
)
, if C
2b
2 < 1,
(eǫ+1)2·eǫ
(eǫ−1)2·(eǫ−a)2 − 1, if C
2b
2 ≥ 1.
(78)
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Substituting Eq. (76) and Eq. (74) yields
C2b
2
=
(eǫ + 1)2 · e2ǫ
2(eǫ − 1)2(eǫ − a)2 ·
a(eǫ − 1)
eǫ
=
(eǫ + 1)2 · eǫ · a
2(eǫ − 1)(eǫ − a)2
< 1, (79)
and
2(eǫ − 1)a2 − [4(eǫ − 1)eǫ + (eǫ + 1)2 · eǫ] a
+ 2(eǫ − 1)e2ǫ > 0. (80)
To solve Eq. (80), we denote the smaller solution of the
quadratic function as
a∗ =
eǫ(e2ǫ + 6eǫ − 3)− (eǫ + 1)eǫ
√
(eǫ + 1)2 + 8(eǫ − 1)
4(eǫ − 1) .
(81)
From Eq. (14), we get
P−C←0 ≥ P−C←1. (82)
Then, substituting P−C←0 and P−C←1 with Eq. (49) and
Eq. (51) in Eq. (82) yields
1− P0←0
2
≥ (1− P0←1)
eǫ + 1
. (83)
Hence,
a = P0←0 ≤ e
ǫ
eǫ + 2
. (84)
From Eq. (84), we know that the Eq. (80) will be ensured (i)
when 0 ≤ a < a∗ if a∗ < eǫeǫ+2 , or (ii) when 0 ≤ a ≤ e
ǫ
eǫ+2 if
a∗ ≥ eǫeǫ+2 . Hence, by combining with Eq. (78), we obtain
max
x∈[−1,1]
Var[Y |x] =

(eǫ+1)2·e2ǫ
(eǫ−1)2
(
1−a
(eǫ−a)2 +
(eǫ+1)2·a2
4(eǫ−a)4
)
,
for 0 ≤ a < a∗,
(eǫ+1)2·eǫ
(eǫ−1)2·(eǫ−a)2 − 1,
for a∗ ≤ a ≤ eǫeǫ+2 ,
, if a∗ < e
ǫ
eǫ+2
(eǫ+1)2·e2ǫ
(eǫ−1)2
(
1−a
(eǫ−a)2 +
(eǫ+1)2·a2
4(eǫ−a)4
)
,
for 0 ≤ a ≤ eǫeǫ+2 , if a∗ ≥ e
ǫ
eǫ+2 .
(85)
Substituting Eq. (81) into a∗ = e
ǫ
eǫ+2 yields
eǫ(e2ǫ + 6eǫ − 3)− (eǫ + 1)eǫ
√
(eǫ + 1)2 + 8(eǫ − 1)
4(eǫ − 1)
=
eǫ
eǫ + 2
. (86)
After solving Eq. (86), we get ǫ = ln 4.
According to Fig. 16, we obtain that a∗ ≥ eǫeǫ+2 if 0 < ǫ ≤
ln 4. Since ǫ = ln 4 is the only solution if ǫ > 0, we conclude
that a∗ > e
ǫ
eǫ+2 if ǫ > ln 4. Therefore, we can replace the
condition a∗ < e
ǫ
eǫ+2 and write the variance as follows:
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Fig. 16: Compare a∗ with e
ǫ
eǫ+2 .
maxx∈[−1,1]Var[Y |x] =

(eǫ+1)2·e2ǫ
(eǫ−1)2
(
1−a
(eǫ−a)2 +
(eǫ+1)2·a2
4(eǫ−a)4
)
,
for 0 ≤ a < a∗,
(eǫ+1)2·eǫ
(eǫ−1)2·(eǫ−a)2 − 1,
for a∗ ≤ a ≤ eǫeǫ+2 ,
, if ǫ < ln 4,
(eǫ + 1)2 · e2ǫ
(eǫ − 1)2
(
1− a
(eǫ − a)2 +
(eǫ + 1)2 · a2
4(eǫ − a)4
)
,
for 0 ≤ a ≤ e
ǫ
eǫ + 2
, if ǫ ≥ ln 4.
(87a)
(87b)
To simplify the calculation of the minimum
maxx∈[−1,1]Var[Y |x] in Eq. (87), we define
f1(a) :=
(eǫ + 1)2 · e2ǫ
(eǫ − 1)2
(
1− a
(eǫ − a)2 +
(eǫ + 1)2 · a2
4(eǫ − a)4
)
, (88)
and
f2(a) :=
(eǫ + 1)2 · eǫ
(eǫ − 1)2 · (eǫ − a)2 − 1. (89)
First order derivative of f2(a) in Eq. (89) is
f ′2(a) =
2eǫ(eǫ + 1)2
(eǫ − 1)2(eǫ − a)3 > 0. (90)
Since f ′2(a) > 0, the worst-case noise variance monotonously
increases if a ∈ [a∗, eǫeǫ+2 ], we can get optimal a by analyzing
f1(a) in Eq. (88) when a ∈ [0, a∗) if ǫ < ln 4. First order
derivative of Eq. (88) is
f ′1(a) =
2(1− a)
(eǫ − a)3 −
1
(eǫ − a)2 +
a(eǫ + 1)2
2(eǫ − a)4 +
a2(eǫ + 1)2
(eǫ − a)5 .
(91)
After simplifying f ′1(a), we have
f ′1(a) =
−2a3 − a2(−e2ǫ − 5− 4eǫ)
2(eǫ − a)5
+
−a(7eǫ − 4e2ǫ − e3ǫ)− (2e3ǫ − 4e2ǫ))
2(eǫ − a)5 . (92)
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Since 2(eǫ−a)5 > 0, solving f ′1(a) = 0 is equivalent to solve
the following equation
2a3 + a2(−e2ǫ − 5− 4eǫ) + a(7eǫ − 4e2ǫ − e3ǫ)
+ (2e3ǫ − 4e2ǫ) = 0. (93)
We define coefficients of Eq. (93) as follows:
c3 := 2, (94)
c2 := −e2ǫ − 5− 4eǫ, (95)
c1 := 7e
ǫ − 4e2ǫ − e3ǫ, (96)
c0 := 2e
3ǫ − 4e2ǫ. (97)
The general solution of the cubic equation involves calculation
of
∆0 = c2
2 − 3c3c1
= (−e2ǫ − 5− 4eǫ)2 − 3× 2(7eǫ − 4e2ǫ − e3ǫ)
= e4ǫ + 14e3ǫ + 50e2ǫ − 2eǫ + 25 > 0,
∆1 = 2c2
3 − 9c3c2c1 + 27c23c0
= 2(−e2ǫ − 5− 4eǫ)3
− 9× 2(−e2ǫ − 5− 4eǫ)(7eǫ − 4e2ǫ − e3ǫ)
+ 27× 22(2e3ǫ − 4e2ǫ)
= −2e6ǫ − 42e5ǫ − 270e4ǫ − 404e3ǫ − 918e2ǫ
+ 30eǫ − 250 < 0,
C =
3
√
∆1 ±
√
∆21 − 4∆30
2
.
Substituting ∆0 and ∆1 into C yields
∆21 − 4∆30
= (−2c6 − 42c5 − 270c4 − 404c3 − 918c2 + 30c− 250)2
− 4(c4 + 14c3 + 50c2 − 2c+ 25)3 < 0,
then √
∆21 − 4∆30 = i
√
4∆30 −∆21, (98)
finally,
C =
3
√
∆1 − i
√
4∆30 −∆21
2
.
To eliminate the imaginary number, we change Eq. (157) using
Euler’s formula. Define mold of C as follows:
|C| = (|C|3)1/3 =
(√
∆21
4
+ ∆30 −
∆21
4
)1/3
=
√
∆0, (99)
C = |C|eiθ, (100)
C3 = |C|3e3iθ =
√
∆30e
3iθ. (101)
Therefore, we obtain C =
√
∆0e
iθ. According to Euler’s
Formula, we have
ei3θ = cos 3θ + i sin 3θ, (102)
cos 3θ =
∆1
2∆
3
2
0
< 0, (103)
sin 3θ = −
√
4∆30 −∆21
2∆
3
2
0
< 0. (104)
Hereby,
3θ = −π + arccos(− ∆1
2∆
3
2
0
), (105)
θ = −π
3
+
1
3
arccos(− ∆1
2∆
3
2
0
). (106)
The solution of the cubic function is
ak = − 1
3c3
(c2 + ξ
kC +
∆0
ξkC
), k ∈ {0, 1, 2}. (107)
To solve Eq. (107), we have the following cases:
• If k = 0, we have
a0 = − 1
3c3
(c2 + C +
∆0
C
). (108)
Substituting θ (106) and c2 (95) into Eq. (108) yields
a0=−1
6
(−e2ǫ−4eǫ− 5
+2
√
∆0 cos(−π
3
+
1
3
arccos(− ∆1
2∆
3
2
0
))). (109)
• If k = 1, we have
a1 = − 1
3c3
(c2 + ξC +
∆0
ξC
)
= − 1
3c3
(c2 + (−1
2
+
√
3i
2
)C +
∆0
(− 12 +
√
3i
2 )C
)
= − 1
3c3
(c2 + Ce
i 2π3 +
∆0
C
ei
4π
3 )
= − 1
3c3
(c2 +
√
∆0e
i(θ+ 23π) +
√
∆0e
i( 4π3 −θ)).
(110)
Simplify Eq. (110) using Eq. (102), we have
a1 = − 1
3c3
(c2 + 2
√
∆0 cos(θ +
2π
3
)). (111)
Substituting θ (106) and c2 (95) into Eq. (111) yields
a1 = −1
6
(−e2ǫ − 4eǫ − 5
+ 2
√
∆0 cos(
π
3
+
1
3
arccos(− ∆1
2∆
3
2
0
))). (112)
• If k = 2, we get
a2 = − 1
3c3
(c2 + ξ
2C +
∆0
ξ2C
)
= − 1
3c3
(c2 + (−1
2
+
√
3i
2
)2C +
∆0
(− 12 +
√
3i
2 )
2C
)
= − 1
3c3
(c2 + (−1
2
−
√
3i
2
)C +
∆0
(− 12 −
√
3i
2 )C
)
= − 1
3c3
(c2 +
√
∆0e
i(θ+ 4π3 ) +
√
∆0e
i( 2π3 −θ)). (113)
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Simplify Eq. (113) using Eq. (102), we obtain
a2 = − 1
3c3
(c2 + 2
√
∆0 cos(θ − 2π
3
)). (114)
Substituting θ (106) and c2 (95) into Eq. (114) yields
a2 = −1
6
(−e2ǫ − 4eǫ − 5
+ 2
√
∆0 cos(−π + 1
3
arccos(− ∆1
2∆
3
2
0
))). (115)
The number of real and complex roots are determined by the
discriminant of the cubic equation as follows:
∆ = 18c3c2c1c0 − 4c32c0 + c22c21 − 4c3c31 − 27c23c20. (116)
Substituting c3 (94), c2 (95), c1 (96) and c0 (97) into ∆ (116)
yields
∆ = e2ǫ(eǫ + 1)2(e6ǫ + 30e5ǫ
+ 279e4ǫ + 580e3ǫ − 2385e2eǫ + 606eǫ − 775). (117)
If ∆ = 0, we get ǫ = ln(root of ǫ6+30ǫ5+279ǫ4+580ǫ3−
2385ǫ2 + 606ǫ− 775 near ǫ = 1.87686) ≈ 0.629598.
• If 0 < ǫ < 0.629598, ∆ < 0, the equation has one real
root and two non-real complex conjugate roots.
• If ǫ = 0.629598, ∆ = 0, the equation has a multiple root
all of its roots are real.
• If ǫ > 0.629598, ∆ > 0, the equation has three distinct
real roots.
From the simplified f ′1(a) Eq. (92), we know that the sign and
roots of f ′1(a) are same as its numerator, defined as follows:
g(a) := −2a3 − a2(−e2ǫ − 5− 4eǫ)
− a(7eǫ − 4e2ǫ − e3ǫ)− (2e3ǫ − 4e2ǫ). (118)
Let c = eǫ, we can change g(a) to the following:
g(a) = −2a3 − a2(−c2 − 5− 4c)− a(7c− 4c2 − c3)
− (2c3 − 4c2). (119)
Case 1: If 0 < ǫ < 0.629598, by observing a0, a1, a2, it
is obvious that a2 is a real root. Fig. 17 shows that a2 > 1.
Since a2 is the only real value root, Eq. (91) f
′
1(a) > 0 if
0 < ǫ ≤ 0.629598 and f ′1(a) ≤ 0 if ǫ > 0.629598, f1(a)
monotonously increases if 0 < ǫ ≤ 0.629598. Therefore, we
conclude that a = 0.
Case 2: If 0.629598 ≤ ǫ < ln 2, ∆ ≥ 0, we get real roots.
• If a = 0, g(0) = −(2c3 − 4c2).
• If a = 2, g(2) = 2(8c2 + c+ 2) > 0.
• If a = +∞, lima→∞ g(a) = −∞ < 0.
If there is a root is in [0, e
ǫ
eǫ+2 ], which means g(0) ≤ 0. By
solving g(0) = −(2c3 − 4c2) ≤ 0, we have c ≥ 2 meaning
ǫ ≥ ln 2. In this case 0.629598 < ǫ < ln 2, we have a root ∈
(2,+∞).
Based on the properties of cubic function, we have
a0a1 + a0a2 + a1a2 =
c1
c3
=
7eǫ − 4e2ǫ − e3ǫ
2
, (120)
a0a1a2 = −c0
c3
= −2e
3ǫ − 4e2ǫ
2
. (121)
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Fig. 17: a2 if ǫ ∈ [0, 0.629598].
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Fig. 18: a0a1+a0a2+a1a2 and a0a1a2 if ǫ ∈ [0.629598, ln2].
Fig. 18 shows that a0a1 + a0a2 + a1a2 < 0 (Eq. (120))
and a0a1a2 > 0 (Eq. (121)). Therefore, we can conclude that
there are one positive real root and two negative real roots or
a multiple root. Since two negative roots are out of the a’s
domain, we only discuss the positive root.
• If a ∈ [0, root), g(a) > 0 meaning f ′1(a) > 0.
• If a ∈ [root,+∞), g(a) ≤ 0 meaning f ′1(a) ≤ 0.
From above we know that g(a) > 0, so that f1(a)
monotonously increases if a ∈ [0, eǫeǫ+2 ]. Therefore, a = 0.
Case 3: If ln 2 ≤ ǫ ≤ ln 5.53, ∆ > 0, there are three distinct
real roots. Since a0a1 + a0a2 + a1a2 < 0 and a0a1a2 < 0,
there are one negative root or three negative roots. If there are
three negative roots, a0a1+a0a2+a1a2 > 0, there is only one
negative root, f ′1(a) have two positive roots and one negative
root.
• If a = 0, g(0) = −(2c3 − 4c2) < 0.
• If a = 2, g(2) = 2(8c2 + c+ 2) > 0.
• If a = +∞, lima→∞ g(a) = −∞.
From above results, we can deduce that there is one positive
root in (0, 2) defined as root1, the other positive root is in
(2,+∞) defined as root2. Since root2 > 1, we only discuss
root1.
• a ∈ [0, root1], g(a) ≤ 0.
• a ∈ (root1, root2), g(a) > 0.
22
Therefore, if g( cc+2 ) ≥ 0, we can conclude that root1 ≤ cc+2 .
The exact form of g( cc+2) is
g
(
c
c+ 2
)
=
c2(c+ 1)2(−c2 + 3c+ 14)
(c+ 2)3
. (122)
By solving g( cc+2 ) ≥ 0, we have c ≤ ln
(
3+
√
65
2
)
≈ 5.53,
i.e. ǫ ≤ ln 5.53. From Fig. 19, we can conclude that a1 is the
correct root, a0 < 0 and a2 > 1. a = a1 = − 16 (−e2ǫ − 4eǫ −
5 + 2
√
∆0 cos(
π
3 +
1
3 arccos(− ∆1
2∆
3
2
0
))).
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Fig. 19: a0, a1 and a2 if ǫ ∈ [ln 2, ln 5.53].
Case 4: If ǫ > ln 5.53, ∆ > 0, there are three distinct real
roots. From analysis in Case 3, we know that if ǫ > ln 5.53,
root1 >
c
c+2 and g(
c
c+2 ) < 0. We know that g(a) ≤ 0 if
a ∈ [0, cc+2 ], meaning f ′1(a) < 0, so that f1(a) monotonously
decreases if ǫ > ln 5.53. Since a ∈ [0, eǫeǫ+2 ], we have a =
eǫ
eǫ+2 .
Summarize above, we obtain the optimal a which is named
as P0←0 in the Eq. (5).

F. Proof of Lemma 5
By substituting the optimal P0←0 of Eq. (5) with a in the
maxx∈[−1,1]Var[Y |x] of Eq. (87), we obtain the worst-case
noise variance of Three-Outputs as follows:
min
P0←0
max
x∈[−1,1]
Var[Y |x] =
(eǫ+1)2
(eǫ−1)2 , for ǫ < ln 2,
(eǫ+1)2·e2ǫ
(eǫ−1)2
(
1−P0←0
(eǫ−P0←0)2 +
(eǫ+1)2·P 20←0
4(eǫ−P0←0)4
)
, for ln 2 ≤ ǫ ≤ ln 5.53,
where P0←0 = − 16 (−e2ǫ − 4eǫ − 5
+2
√
∆0 cos(
π
3 +
1
3 arccos(− ∆1
2∆
3
2
0
)))
(eǫ+2)(eǫ+10)
4(eǫ−1)2 , for ǫ > ln 5.53.
(123)

G. Proof of
2(eǫ−a)2(eǫ−1)−aeǫ(eǫ+1)2
2(eǫ−a)2(eǫ+t)−aeǫ(eǫ+1)2 ≤ e
ǫ−1
eǫ+t if t =
ǫ
3
Proposition 1.
2(eǫ−a)2(eǫ−1)−aeǫ(eǫ+1)2
2(eǫ−a)2(eǫ+t)−aeǫ(eǫ+1)2 ≤ e
ǫ−1
eǫ+t for ǫ >
0.
Define
f :=
2(eǫ − a)2(eǫ − 1)− aeǫ(eǫ + 1)2
2(eǫ − a)2(eǫ + ǫ3 )− aeǫ(eǫ + 1)2
− e
ǫ − 1
eǫ + ǫ3
=
aeǫ(eǫ + 1)2(t+ 1)
(aeǫ(eǫ + 1)2 − 2(eǫ − a)2(eǫ + ǫ3 ))(eǫ + ǫ3 )
,
(124)
and
h := 2(eǫ − a)2(eǫ + ǫ
3
)− aeǫ(eǫ + 1)2. (125)
When ǫ > 0, we have eǫ+ ǫ3 > 0 and ae
ǫ(eǫ+1)2( ǫ3 +1) > 0
(the numerator of Eq. (124)).
• If 0 < ǫ < ln 2, we have a = 0 and h = −2e2ǫ(eǫ +
eǫ/3) < 0. Therefore, we conclude that Eq. (124) < 0.
• If ln 2 ≤ ǫ ≤ ln 5.53, we have a = − 16 (−e2ǫ − 4eǫ −
5 + 2
√
∆0 cos(
π
3 +
1
3 arccos(− ∆1
2∆
3
2
0
))). Fig. 20 shows
that h := 2(eǫ − a)2(eǫ + t)− aeǫ(eǫ + 1)2 < 0, so that
we obtain Eq. (124) < 0.
• If ǫ > ln 5.53, we have a = e
ǫ
eǫ+2 and h =
e2ǫ(eǫ+1)2(−2+eǫ+2eǫ/3)
(eǫ+2)2 . Since e
ǫ and eǫ/3 > 1, we
obtain −2 + eǫ + 2eǫ/3 > 0 and h > 0. Hence, we
conclude that Eq. (124) < 0.
Based on above analysis, we have Eq. (124)) < 0 when ǫ > 0,
meaning that
2(eǫ−a)2(eǫ−1)−aeǫ(eǫ+1)2
2(eǫ−a)2(eǫ+t)−aeǫ(eǫ+1)2 ≤ e
ǫ−1
eǫ+t when ǫ > 0.

H. Proof of 2(eǫ − a)2(eǫ + t)− aeǫ(eǫ + 1)2 > 0.
From values of ǫ, we have the following cases:
• If 0 < ǫ ≤ ln 5.53, we have 2(eǫ−a)2(eǫ+ t)−aeǫ(eǫ+
1)2 > 0 referring to Fig. 20.
• If ǫ > ln 5.53, we have a = e
ǫ
eǫ+2 and t = e
ǫ
3 , so that
2(eǫ − a)2(eǫ + t)− aeǫ(eǫ + 1)2
=
e2ǫ(eǫ + 1)2(eǫ − 2 + 2e ǫ3 )
(eǫ + 2)2
. (126)
Since
e2ǫ(eǫ+1)2(−eǫ+2−2e ǫ3 )
(eǫ+2)2 > 0 if ǫ > 0, we have
2(eǫ − a)2(eǫ + t)− aeǫ(eǫ + 1)2 > 0 if ǫ > ln 5.53.
Thus, we conclude that 2(eǫ−a)2(eǫ+t)−aeǫ(eǫ+1)2 > 0
if ǫ > 0. 
I. Proving Lemma 6
From Eq. (26a) and Eq. (26b), for any Y ∈ [−A,A] and
any two input values x1, x2 ∈ [−1, 1], we have pdf(Y |x1)pdf(Y |x2) ≤
c
d = exp(ǫ). Thus, Algorithm 3 satisfies local differential
privacy. For notational simplicity, with a fixed ǫ below, we
will write L(ǫ, x, t) and R(ǫ, x, t) as Lx and Rx. Based on
proper probability distribution, we have∫ A
−A
F [Y = y|x] dy = c(Rx − Lx) + d[2A− (Rx − Lx)] = 1.
(127)
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Fig. 20: Value 2(eǫ − a)2(eǫ + t) − aeǫ(eǫ + 1)2 > 0, when
ǫ ∈ (0, ln 5.53].
In addition,
E[Y = y|x] =
∫ A
−A
y · pdf(Y = y|x) dy
= c(Rx − Lx) + d[2A− (Rx − Lx)]
=
d
2
· (Lx2 −A2) + c
2
(Rx
2 − Lx2) + d
2
· (A2 −Rx2)
= x. (128)
By solving above Eq. (127) and Eq. (128), we have{
Lx =
x
1−2Ad − 1−2Ad2(c−d) ,
Rx =
x
1−2Ad +
1−2Ad
2(c−d) .
(129)
With −A ≤ y ≤ A, the constraint −A ≤ Lx < Rx ≤ A for
any −1 ≤ x ≤ 1 in Eq. (26), Eq. (28) and Eq. (29) implies
Ad <
1
2
, (130)
A ≥ 1
1− 2Ad +
1− 2Ad
2(c− d) . (131)
For notational simplicity, we define α and ξ as
α := Ad, (132)
ξ :=
c− d
d
, (133)
where it is clear under privacy parameter ǫ that
ξ = eǫ − 1. (134)
Applying Eq. (132) and Eq. (133) to Inequality (130) and
Eq. (131), we obtain
α
d
≥ 1
1− 2α +
1− 2α
2ξd
, (135)
α <
1
2
. (136)
The condition Eq. (135) induces d ≤ (2ξ+4)α−(4+4ξ)α2−12ξ =
[(2ξ+2)α−1](1−2α)
2ξ . In view of
1
2(ξ+1) =
1
2eǫ < α <
1
2 , we
define t satisfying 0 < t < ∞ such that α = t+12(t+eǫ) . Note
that limt→0 t+12(t+eǫ) =
1
2eǫ , limt→∞
t+1
2(t+eǫ) =
1
2 and d =
[(2ξ+2)α−1](1−2α)
2ξ =
1
2ξ · ξtt+1+ξ · ξt+1+ξ = t(e
ǫ−1)
2(t+eǫ)2 .
Applying α, d and ξ to Eq. (129), we have{
Lx=
x
1−2α − 1−2α2ξd = x · e
ǫ+t
eǫ−1 − e
ǫ+t
t(eǫ−1) =
(eǫ+t)(xt−1)
t(eǫ−1) ,
Rx=
x
1−2α +
1−2α
2ξd = x · e
ǫ+t
eǫ−1 +
eǫ+t
t(eǫ−1) =
(eǫ+t)(xt+1)
t(eǫ−1) .
(137)
Furthermore, the variance of Y is
Var[Y |x] = E[Y 2| x]− (E[Y |x])2
=
∫ A
−A
y2F [Y = y|x] dy − x2
=
∫ Lx
−A
dy2 dy +
∫ Rx
Lx
cy2 dy +
∫ A
Rx
dy2 dy − x2
= max
x∈[−1,1]
d
3
[Lx
3 − (−A)3] + c
3
(Rx
3 − Lx3)+
d
3
(A3 −Rx3)− x2
=
2d
3
A3 +
(c− d)
3
(Rx
3 − Lx3)− x2. (138)
Substituting Eq. (129) into Eq. (138) yields
Var[Y |x] = 2d
3
A3 +
(c− d)
3
·[(
x
1− 2Ad +
1− 2Ad
2(c− d)
)3
−
(
x
1− 2Ad−
1− 2Ad
2(c− d)
)3]
− x2
=
2d
3
A3 +
(c− d)
3
·{
6
(
x
1− 2Ad
)2
× 1− 2Ad
2(c− d) + 2
[
1− 2Ad
2(c− d)
]3}
− x2
=
(
1
1− 2Ad − 1
)
x2 +
2d
3
A3 +
(1− 2Ad)3
12(c− d)2 . (139)
Substituting 1−2α = eǫ−1eǫ+t , d = t(e
ǫ−1)
2(t+eǫ)2 , ξ =
c−d
d , ξ = e
ǫ−1,
and α = t+12(t+eǫ) into Eq. (139) yields
Var[Y |x] = t+ 1
eǫ − 1x
2 +
(t+ eǫ)
(
(t+ 1)3 + eǫ − 1)
3t2(eǫ − 1)2 . (140)

J. Calculate the probability of a variable Y falling in the
interval [L(ǫ, x, eǫ/3), R(ǫ, x, eǫ/3)].
By replacing t in Eq.(26) of PM-OPT with eǫ/3, we obtain
the probability as follows:
P
[
L(ǫ, x, eǫ/3) ≤ Y ≤ R(ǫ, x, eǫ/3)
]
=
∫ R(ǫ,x,eǫ/3)
L(ǫ,x,eǫ/3)
c dY
=
∫ (eǫ+eǫ/3)(xeǫ/3+1)
eǫ/3(eǫ−1)
(eǫ+eǫ/3)(xeǫ/3−1)
eǫ/3(eǫ−1)
eǫt(eǫ − 1)
2(t+ eǫ)2
dY
=
eǫ
eǫ/3 + eǫ
.
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K. Proof of Lemma 8
The expression of these two probabilities in Eq. (143) can
be solved from the following:
proper distribution so that
P
[
Z =
kC
m
| Y = y
]
+ P
[
Z =
(k + 1)C
m
| Y = y
]
= 1,
E [Z | Y = y] = y so that(
kC
m × P
[
Z = kCm | Y = y
]
+ (k+1)Cm × P
[
Z = (k+1)Cm | Y = y
] ) = y.
(141a)
(141b)
Summarizing ① and ②, with k := ⌊ ymC ⌋, we have
P [Z = z | Y = y] =
k + 1−
ym
C , if z =
kC
m ,
ym
C − k, if z = (k+1)Cm .
(142)
In the perturbation step, the distribution of Y given the input
x is given by
F [Y = y | x] =
{
p1, if y ∈ [L(x), R(x)],
p2, if y ∈ [−C,L(x)) ∪ (R(x), C].
(143)
Hence,
P [Z = z | x]
=
∫
y
P [Z = z | x and Y = y]F [Y = y | x] dy
=
∫
y
P [Z = z | Y = y]F [Y = y | x] dy. (144)
In addition, our mechanisms are unbiased, such that
E[Y | x] =
∫
y
y × F [Y = y | x] dy = x. (145)
Therefore, we obtain
E[Z | x] =
∑
z
z × P [Z = z | x]
=
∑
z
z ×
∫
y
P [Z = z | Y = y]F [Y = y | x] dy
=
∫
y
(∑
z
z × P [Z = z | Y = y]
)
F [Y = y | x] dy
=
∫
y
y × F [Y = y | x] dy = x. (146)

L. Proof of Lemma 9
To prove Var[Z|X = x] ≥ Var[Y |X = x], it is equivalent
to prove
E
[
Z2|X = x]− (E [Z|X = x])2
≥ E [Y 2|X = x]− (E [Y |X = x])2.
Since M1 and M2 are unbiased, we have E [Z|X = x] =
E [Y |X = x] = x. Hence, it is sufficient to prove
E
[
Z2|X = x] ≥ E [Y 2|X = x] . (147)
We can derive that
E
[
Z2|X = x]
=
∑
z
z2 · P [Z = z|X = x]
=
∑
z
z2
∫
y
P [Z = z|Y = y] · F [Y = y|X = x] dy
=
∫
y
∑
z
z2P [Z = z|Y = y] · F [Y = y|X = x] dy
=
∫
y
E
[
Z2|Y = y] · F [Y = y|X = x] dy, (148)
and
E
[
Y 2|X = x] = ∫
y
y2 · F [Y = y|X = x] dy. (149)
To prove Inequality (147), because of Eq. (148) and
Eq. (149), it is sufficient to prove
E
[
Z2|Y = y] ≥ y2, ∀y ∈ Range(Y ). (150)
After getting the intermediate output y from M1, we may
discretize the intermediate output y into z1 with probability
p1 and z2 with probability p2. Hereby,
p1 + p2 = 1.
Mechanism M2 is unbiased, so that E [Z|Y = y] = y, and
we have
p1 · z1 + p2 · z2 = y.
According to Cauchy–Schwarz inequality, we have
E
[
Z2|Y = y] = p1 · z21 + p2 · z22
= [(
√
p1)
2 + (
√
p2)
2][(
√
p1z1)
2 + (
√
p2z2)
2]
≥ (p1 · z1 + p2 · z2)2 = y2.
Thus, we get Inequality (147) and Inequality (150). 
M. Proof of Lemma 10
The maxx∈[−1,1]VarH[Y |x] is minimized when
β = (151)
0, If 0 < ǫ < ǫ∗,
β1 =
2(eǫ−a)2(eǫ−1)−aeǫ(eǫ+1)2
2(eǫ−a)2(eǫ+t)−aeǫ(eǫ+1)2 , If ǫ
∗ ≤ ǫ < ln 2,
β3 =
−
√
B
A+e
ǫ−1
eǫ+eǫ/3
, If ǫ ≥ ln 2,
Where
ǫ∗ := 3 ln(root of 3x5 − 2x3 + 3x2 − 5x− 3 near x = 1.22588)
≈ 0.610986. (152)
Proof. If x = x∗ = (β−1)ae
ǫ(eǫ+1)2
2(eǫ−a)2(β(eǫ+t)−eǫ+1) , we have
variance of Y as follows:
VarH[Y |x∗]
25
= (β
t+ 1
eǫ − 1 + β − 1)
(
(β − 1)aeǫ(eǫ + 1)2
2(eǫ − a)2(β(eǫ + t)− eǫ + 1)
)2
+ (1− β) ae
ǫ(eǫ + 1)2
(eǫ − 1)(eǫ − a)2
(
(β − 1)aeǫ(eǫ + 1)2
2(eǫ − a)2(β(eǫ + t)− eǫ + 1)
)
+
(
(t+ eǫ)((t+ 1)3 + eǫ − 1)
3t2(eǫ − 1)2 β
+ (1− β)(1 − a) e
2ǫ(eǫ + 1)2
(eǫ − 1)2(eǫ − a)2
)
. (153)
Let γ := β(eǫ + t)− eǫ + 1 and c := eǫ, we can transform
VarH[Y |x∗] Eq. (153) to the following:
γ
(
a2c2(c+ 1)4
4(c+ t)2(c− a)4(c− 1) −
a2c2(c+ 1)4
2(c+ t)2(c− 1)(c− a)4
+
(t+ 1)3 + c− 1
3t2(c− 1)2 −
(1− a)c2(c+ 1)2
(c+ t)(c− 1)2(c− a)2
)
+
1
γ
(
(1 + t)2a2c2(c+ 1)4
4(c+ t)2(c− a)4(c− 1) −
(1 + t)2a2c2(c+ 1)4
2(c+ t)2(c− 1)(c− a)4
)
− (1 + t)a
2c2(c+ 1)4
2(c+ t)2(c− a)4(c− 1) +
(1 + t)a2c2(c+ 1)4
(c+ t)2(c− 1)(c− a)4
+
(t+ 1)3 + c− 1
3t2(c− 1) +
(1 + t)(1 − a)c2(c+ 1)2
(c+ t)(c− 1)2(c− a)2 . (154)
Set coefficient of γ as A :
A :=
a2c2(c+ 1)4
4(c+ t)2(c− a)4(c− 1) −
a2c2(c+ 1)4
2(c+ t)2(c− 1)(c− a)4
+
(t+ 1)3 + c− 1
3t2(c− 1)2 −
(1− a)c2(c+ 1)2
(c+ t)(c− 1)2(c− a)2 . (155)
Set coefficient of 1γ as B :
B := − (1 + t)
2a2c2(c+ 1)4
4(c+ t)2(c− a)4(c− 1) . (156)
Set C as :
C := − (1 + t)a
2c2(c+ 1)4
2(c+ t)2(c− a)4(c− 1) +
(1 + t)a2c2(c+ 1)4
(c+ t)2(c− 1)(c− a)4
+
(t+ 1)3 + c− 1
3t2(c− 1) +
(1 + t)(1− a)c2(c+ 1)2
(c+ t)(c− 1)2(c− a)2 . (157)
Since γ monotonically increases with β in the domain β ∈
(0, β1), the minimum γ is γ1 := −eǫ+1 at β = 0, maximum
γ is γ2 := 0 at β = β1.
• If 0 < ǫ < ln 2, a = 0, we have
A =
(t+ 1)3 + c− 1
3t2(c− 1)2 −
(c+ 1)2
(c+ t)(c− 1)2 ,
B = 0,
VarH[Y |x∗] = Aγ + C is a linear function.
-If β ∈ (0, β1), Appendix O proves:
a) A > 0, if 0 < ǫ < 0.610986.
b) A = 0, if ǫ = 0.610986.
c) A < 0, if 0.610986 < ǫ < β1.
Therefore, minβ maxx∈[−1,1]VarH[Y |x] is at:
a) β = 0, if 0 < ǫ < 0.610986.
b) β = β1, if 0.610986 ≤ ǫ < ln 2.
-If β ∈ [β1, β2], slope1 = t+1eǫ−1+1+ (t+e
ǫ)((t+1)3+eǫ−1)
3t2(eǫ−1)2 −
(eǫ+1)2
(eǫ−1)2 , slope2 =
(t+eǫ)((t+1)3+eǫ−1)
3t2(eǫ−1)2 − (e
ǫ+1)2
(eǫ−1)2 .
Fig. 21 proves that slope1 > 0, when ǫ ∈ [0, ln 2].
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Fig. 21: slope1 when ǫ ∈ [0, ln 2].
When a = 0, β1 (179) = βintersection (181) =
eǫ−1
t+eǫ , the
intersection of VarH[Y |0] and VarH[Y |1] is at β1.
When slope2 = 0, we have root at ǫ = 3 ln(root of 3x
5−
2x3 + 3x2 − 5x− 3 near x = 1.22588) ≈ 0.610986.
From Fig. 22, we have:
(1) If 0 < ǫ < 0.610986, slope2 > 0.
(2) If ǫ = 0.610986, slope2 = 0.
(3) If ǫ > 0.610986, slope2 < 0.
Based on previous analysis, we have:
(1) If 0 < ǫ < 0.610986,
minβ maxx∈[−1,1]VarH[Y |x] =
maxx∈[−1,1]VarH[Y |x, β = β1].
(2) If ǫ = 0.610986, minβ maxx∈[−1,1]VarH[Y |x] =
VarH[Y |1, β = β1].
(3) If ǫ > 0.610986, minβ maxx∈[−1,1]VarH[Y |x] =
VarH[Y |1, β = β1].
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7
privacy budget 
-2000
0
2000
4000
6000
8000
10000
12000
14000
sl
op
e 2
Fig. 22: slope2 when ǫ ∈ [0, ln 2].
Therefore, minβ maxx∈[−1,1]VarH[Y |x] is at β = β1 if
β ∈ [β1, β2]. Summarize above analysis, we can conclude
that minβ maxx∈[−1,1]VarH[Y |x] =
– VarH[Y |x∗, β = 0], if 0 < ǫ < 0.610986.
– maxx∈[−1,1]VarH[Y |x, β = β1], if 0.610986 ≤ ǫ <
ln 2.
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• If ln 2 ≤ ǫ ≤ ln 5.53,
When β ∈ (0, β1), Appendix O proves A <
0, B < 0, Appendix N proves when γ = −
√
B
A ,
we have minβ maxx∈[−1,1]VarH[Y |x] =
maxx∈[−1,1]VarH[Y |x, β = β3]. Since
γ := β(c + t) − c + 1, we have β3 :=
−
√
B
A+c−1
c+t . minβ maxx∈[−1,1]VarH[Y |x] =
maxx∈[−1,1]VarH[Y |x∗, β = β3].
When β ∈ [β1, β2], Fig. 23 shows that slope1 > 0 if
ǫ ∈ [ln 2, ln 5.53]. Fig. 24 shows that slope2:
– If 0 < ǫ < 1.4338, slope2 < 0, βintersection <
β1, see Fig. 25, minβ maxx∈[−1,1]VarH[Y |x] =
maxx∈[−1,1]VarH[Y |x, β = β1].
– If ǫ ≈ 1.4338, slope2 = 0, βintersection <
β1, see Fig. 25, minβ maxx∈[−1,1]VarH[Y |x] =
maxx∈[−1,1]VarH[Y |x, β = β1].
– If 1.4338 < ǫ ≤ ln 5.53, slope2 >
0, minβ maxx∈[−1,1]VarH[Y |x] =
maxx∈[−1,1]VarH[Y |x, β = β1].
Since VarH[Y |x, β = β3] < VarH[Y |x, β = β1],
minβ maxx∈[−1,1]VarH[Y |x] is at β = β3.
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Fig. 23: slope1 when ǫ ∈ [ln 2, ln 5.53].
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Fig. 24: slope2 when ǫ ∈ [ln 2, ln 5.53].
• If ǫ > ln 5.53,
– If β ∈ (0, β1), Appendix O proves A < 0 and
B < 0, Appendix N proves when γ = −
√
B
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Fig. 25: βintersection − β1 when ǫ ∈ [ln 2, ln 5.53].
−
√
B
A+c−1
c+t , we get minβ maxx∈[−1,1]VarH[Y |x] =
maxx∈[−1,1]VarH[Y |x, β = β4].
– If β ∈ [β1, β2], Appendix P proves slope1 >
0 and Appendix Q proves slope2 > 0. There-
fore, we obtain minβ maxx∈[−1,1]VarH[Y |x] =
maxx∈[−1,1]VarH[Y |x, β = β1].

N. Proof of the monotonicity of VarH[Y |x∗]
Substituting A (Eq. 155), B (Eq. 156) and C (Eq. 157) into
VarH[Y |x∗] (Eq. 154) yields
VarH[Y |x∗] = Aγ + B
γ
+ C. (158)
The first order derivative of (158) is
VarH[Y |x∗]′ = A− B
γ2
. (159)
If A− Bγ2 = 0, we get two roots:
γ1 = −
√
B
A
, γ2 =
√
B
A
.
Since γ < 0, γ1 is eligible. Hereby,
• If γ ∈ (−∞,−
√
B
A ], VarH[Y |x∗]′ < 0, VarH[Y |x∗]
monotonically decreases.
• If γ ∈ (−
√
B
A , 0), VarH[Y |x∗]′ > 0, VarH[Y |x∗] mono-
tonically increases.

O. The sign of A to ǫ
If A = 0, we have ǫ = 3 ln(root of 3ǫ5 − 2ǫ3 + 3ǫ2 − 5ǫ−
3 near x = 1.22588) ≈ 0.610986.
First order derivative of A is
A′ = −(25eǫ − 27e2ǫ − 9e3ǫ − 12eǫ/3 + 19e2ǫ/3 − e4ǫ/3
+ 41e5ǫ/3 + 7e7ǫ/3 + 5)/(9e2ǫ/3(e2ǫ/3 + 1)2(eǫ − 1)3).
(160)
• If 0 < ǫ < ln 2, Fig. 26 shows that A′ < 0 and A
monotonically decreases if ǫ ∈ (0, ln 2). Therefore, we
have
27
– A > 0, if 0 < ǫ < 0.610986.
– A = 0, if ǫ = 0.610986.
– A < 0, if 0.610986 < ǫ < ln 2.
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Fig. 26: First order derivative of A is less than 0, if 0 < ǫ ≤
ln 2.
• If ln 2 ≤ ǫ ≤ ln 5.53, Fig. 27 shows A < 0.
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Fig. 27: Value A is less than 0, if ln 2 < ǫ ≤ ln 5.53.
• If ǫ > ln 5.53, we obtain
A = −(16eǫ + 21e2ǫ + 3e3ǫ + 36e ǫ3 − 12e 2ǫ3
− 28e 5ǫ3 − 8e 7ǫ3 − 12))/(12e 2ǫ3 (eǫ − e 2ǫ3 + e 5ǫ3 − 1)2.
(161)
When A = 0, we have three roots:
r1 ≈ −16.9563, r2 ≈ −1.2284, r3 ≈ 0.0463914.
If the denominator
= 12e
2ǫ
3 (eǫ − e 2ǫ3 + e 5ǫ3 − 1)2 > 0
and
lim
ǫ→∞−(16e
ǫ + 21e2ǫ + 3e3ǫ
+ 36e
ǫ
3 − 12e 2ǫ3 − 28e 5ǫ3 − 8e 7ǫ3 − 12) = −∞,
r3 is the largest real value root, the sign of
−(16eǫ+21e2ǫ+3e3ǫ+36e ǫ3−12e 2ǫ3 −28e 5ǫ3 −8e 7ǫ3 −12)
doesn’t change, so that A < 0 when ǫ > ln 5.53.

P. The sign of slope1 when ǫ > ln 5.53
If slope1 =
t+ 1
eǫ − 1 + 1−
aeǫ(eǫ + 1)2
(eǫ − 1)(eǫ − a)2
+
(t+ eǫ)((t+ 1)3 + eǫ − 1)
3t2(eǫ − 1)2 −
(1− a)e2ǫ(eǫ + 1)2
(eǫ − 1)2(eǫ − a)2 = 0,
we have two roots:
eǫ1 ≈ −0.141506, eǫ2 ≈ 2.21598.
The first order derivative of slope1 is
slope′1 = −
e
2ǫ
3 (10 eǫ + 20) + 20 eǫ + (−27 eǫ − 45) e ǫ3 + 10
9e
ǫ
3 (eǫ − 1)3 .
The denominator of the slope′1 is > 0. Thus,
lim
ǫ→∞−e
2ǫ
3 (10 eǫ + 20) + 20 eǫ + (−27 eǫ − 45) e ǫ3 + 10
= −∞.
If slope′1 = 0, we have three roots:
eǫ1 ≈ −1.35696, eǫ2 ≈ 0.0169067, eǫ3 ≈ 4.22192.
Since eǫ3 ≈ 4.22192 is the largest real value root, the sign of
slope′1 doesn’t change when e
ǫ > 4.22192. Therefore, when
ǫ > ln 5.53 and slope′1 < 0, slope1 monotonically decreases.
By simplifying slope1, we get
slope1 =
−(9eǫ − 5e2ǫ/3 − 5e4ǫ/3 + 3)
3(eǫ − 1)2 .
Then, we obtain limǫ→∞ slope1 = 0. Thus, we have slope1 > 0
if ǫ > ln 5.53.

Q. The sign of slope2 when ǫ > ln 5.53
When
slope2 =
(t+ eǫ)((t + 1)3 + eǫ − 1)
3t2(eǫ − 1)2
− (1 − a)e
2ǫ(eǫ + 1)2
(eǫ − 1)2(eǫ − a)2 = 0,
we have
ǫ1 ≈ ln−1.24835, ǫ2 ≈ ln 1.52144.
The first order derivative of slope2 is :
slope′2 =
−4 e2ǫ + e 2ǫ3 (9 eǫ + 63)− 23 eǫ + (−20 eǫ − 10) e ǫ3 − 3
9e
2ǫ
3 (eǫ − 1)3 .
(162)
The denominator of the Eq. (162) is > 0. Besides, from
nominator of Eq. (162), we obtain
lim
ǫ→∞
(−4 e2ǫ + e 2ǫ3 (9 eǫ + 63)− 23 eǫ + (−20 eǫ − 10) e ǫ3 − 3)
= −∞.
28
If Eq. (162) = 0, we have two roots:
ǫ1 = 3 ln(root of 4x
6 − 9x5 + 20x4 + 23x3 − 63x2 + 10x+ 3)
≈ −3.13865,
ǫ2 = 3 ln(root of 4x
6 − 9x5 + 20x4 + 23x3 − 63x2 + 10x+ 3)
≈ 0.709472.
Since ǫ ≈ 0.709472 is the largest real value root, the sign of
slope′2 doesn’t change if ǫ > 0.709472. Therefore, slope
′
2 < 0
if ǫ > ln 5.53. Simplify
slope2 =
3e
ǫ
3 − 3eǫ + 5e 2ǫ3 + 2e 4ǫ3 − 9
3(eǫ − 1)2 ,
and then we get
lim
ǫ→∞ slope2 = 0.
Thus, we have slope2 > 0 if ǫ > ln 5.53. 
R. Proof of Lemma 13
For any i ∈ [1, n], the random variable Y [tj ] − x[tj ]
has zero mean based on Lemma 12. In both PM-SUB and
HMPM-SUB,Three-Outputs, |Y [tj ] − x[tj ]| ≤ dk · (e
ǫ
k +e
ǫ
3k )(e
ǫ
3k+1)
e
ǫ
3k (e
ǫ
k−1) .
By Bernstein’s inequality, we have
P [|Z[tj]−X [tj]| ≥ λ]
= Pr
[
|
n∑
i=1
{Y [tj ]− x[tj ]}| ≥ nλ
]
≤ 2 · exp
( −(nλ)2
2
∑n
i=1Var[Y [tj ]] +
2
3 · nλ · dk · (e
ǫ
k+e
ǫ
3k )(e
ǫ
3k+1)
e
ǫ
3k (e
ǫ
k−1)
)
.
In Algorithm 6, Y [tj ] equals
d
kyj with probability
k
d and 0
with probability 1− kd . Moreover, we obtain E[Y [tj ]] = x[tj ]
from Lemma 12, and then we get
Var[Y [tj ]] = E[(Y [tj ])
2]− E[Y [tj ]]2
=
k
d
E[(
d
k
yj)
2]− (x[tj ])2 = d
k
E[(yj)
2]− (x[tj ])2. (163)
In Algorithm 6, if Line 5 uses PM-SUB, we the variance
in Eq. (140) to compute E[(yj)
2], the asymptotic expression
involving ǫ are in the sense of ǫ→ 0.
E[(yj)
2] = Var[yj] + (E[yj ])
2
=
t( ǫk ) + 1
e
ǫ
k − 1 (x[tj ])
2 +
(t( ǫk ) + e
ǫ
k )
(
(t( ǫk ) + 1)
3 + e
ǫ
k − 1)
3(t( ǫk ))
2(e
ǫ
k − 1)2
+ (x[tj ])
2 = O
(
k2
ǫ2
)
. (164)
In Algorithm 6, if Line 5 uses Three-Outputs, and
then we the variance in Eq. (173) to compute E[(yj)
2], the
asymptotic expression involving ǫ are in the sense of ǫ→ 0.
E[(yj)
2] = Var[yj] + (E[yj ])
2
=
(1 − a)e 2ǫk (e ǫk + 1)2
(e
ǫ
k − 1)2(e ǫk − a)2 +
b|x[tj ]|e 2ǫk (e ǫk + 1)2
(e
ǫ
k − 1)2(e ǫk − a)2 − (x[tj ])
2
+ (x[tj ])
2
=
(1 − a)e 2ǫk (e ǫk + 1)2
(e
ǫ
k − 1)2(e ǫk − a)2 +
b|x[tj ]|e 2ǫk (e ǫk + 1)2
(e
ǫ
k − 1)2(e ǫk − a)2 = O(
k2
ǫ2
),
In Algorithm 6, if Line 5 uses HM-TP, we have:
E[(yj)
2] = Var[yj ] + (E[yj ])
2
=

(e
ǫ
k+1)2
(e
ǫ
k−1)2 + (x[tj ])
2, If 0 < ǫ < ǫ∗,
VarH[Y |1, β1, ǫk ] + (x[tj ])2, If ǫ∗ ≤ ǫ < ln 2,
VarH[Y |1, β3, ǫk ] + (x[tj ])2, If ǫ ≥ ln 2
= O
(
k2
ǫ2
)
, (165)
where ǫ∗ is defined in the Eq. (152). Then,
Var[Y [tj ]] =
d
k
(
t( ǫk ) + 1
e
ǫ
k − 1 (x[tj ])
2
+
(t( ǫk ) + e
ǫ
k )
(
(t( ǫk ) + 1)
3 + e
ǫ
k − 1)
3(t( ǫk ))
2(e
ǫ
k − 1)2 + (x[tj ])
2
)
− (x[tj ])2.
Substituting Eq. (164) into Eq. (163) yields
Var[Y [tj ]] =
d
k
·O
(
k2
ǫ2
)
− (x[tj ])2 = O
(
dk
ǫ2
)
. (166)
Therefore, we obtain
P [|Z[tj ]−X [tj]| ≥ λ] ≤ 2·exp
(
− nλ
2
O(dk/ǫ2) + λ ·O(d/ǫ)
)
.
By the union bound, there exists λ = O
(√
d ln(d/β))
ǫ
√
n
)
.
Therefore, maxj∈[1,d] |Z[tj ]−X [tj]| = λ = O
(√
d ln(d/β))
ǫ
√
n
)
.

S. Calculate k for PM-SUB and Three-Outputs
We calculate the optimal k for PM-SUB and
Three-Outputs.
(I) We calculate the k for d dimension PM-SUB. When
x[tj ] = 1, we get
maxVar[Y [tj ]]
=
d
k
(
t( ǫk ) + 1
e
ǫ
k − 1 +
(t( ǫk ) + e
ǫ
k )
(
(t( ǫk ) + 1)
3 + e
ǫ
k − 1)
3(t( ǫk ))
2(e
ǫ
k − 1)2 + 1
)
− 1.
For PM-SUB, we have
maxVar[Y [tj ]]
=
d
k
(
e
ǫ
3k + 1
e
ǫ
k − 1 +
(e
ǫ
3k + e
ǫ
k )
(
(e
ǫ
3k + 1)3 + e
ǫ
k − 1)
3(e
ǫ
3k )2(e
ǫ
k − 1)2 + 1
)
− 1.
Let s = ǫk , and then
maxVar[Y [tj ]]
=
d
ǫ
· s
(
e
s
3 + 1
es − 1 +
(e
s
3 + es)
(
(e
s
3 + 1)3 + es − 1)
3(e
s
3 )2(es − 1)2 + 1
)
− 1.
Let
f(s) = s ·
(
e
s
3 + 1
es − 1 +
(e
s
3 + es)
(
(e
s
3 + 1)3 + es − 1)
3(e
s
3 )2(es − 1)2 + 1
)
,
and then we obtain
maxVar[Y [tj ]] =
d
ǫ
· f(s)− 1. (167)
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Fig. 28: Find s for min f(s).
From numerical experiments shown in Fig. 28, we con-
clude that we can get min f(s) and minmaxVar[Y [tj ]]
if s = 2.5, i.e. k = ǫ2.5 .
(II) Calculate the k for d dimension Three-Outputs. The
variance of Y [tj ] is
Var[Y [tj ]] =
d
k
(
(1− a)e 2ǫk (e ǫk + 1)2
(e
ǫ
k − 1)2(e ǫk − a)2 +
b|x[tj ]|e 2ǫk (e ǫk + 1)2
(e
ǫ
k − 1)2(e ǫk − a)2
)
− (x[tj ])2
=
d
ǫ
· s ·
(
(1− a)e 2ǫk (e ǫk + 1)2
(e
ǫ
k − 1)2(e ǫk − a)2 +
b|x[tj ]|e 2ǫk (e ǫk + 1)2
(e
ǫ
k − 1)2(e ǫk − a)2
)
− (x[tj ])2,
where b is from Eq. (76) and a is from Eq. (75).
Let x[tj ]
′ = dbe
2ǫ
k (e
ǫ
k +1)2
2k(e
ǫ
k−1)2(e ǫk−a)2 , if 0 < x[tj ]
′ < 1, the
worst-case noise variance of Y is
max
x∈[−1,1]
Var[Y [tj ]] ={
Var[x[tj ]
′], if 0 < x[tj ]′ < 1,
max{Var[0],Var[1]}, otherwise. (168)
Let s = ǫk , and then
x[tj ]
′ =
d
ǫ
· s b(s)e
2s(es + 1)2
2(es − 1)2(es − a(s))2
=
d
ǫ
· s a(s)e
s(es + 1)2
2(es − 1)(es − a(s))2 .
If 0 < dǫ · s a(s)e
s(es+1)2
2(es−1)(es−a(s))2 < 1, and then
maxVar[Y [tj ]] = maxVar[x[tj ]
′] =
=
d
k
(
(1 − a( ǫk ))e
2ǫ
k (e
ǫ
k + 1)2
(e
ǫ
k − 1)2(e ǫk − a)2 +
b( ǫk )x[tj ]
′e
2ǫ
k (e
ǫ
k + 1)2
(e
ǫ
k − 1)2(e ǫk − a)2
)
− (x[tj ]′)2
=
d2
ǫ2
· s2 (b(s))
2e4s(es + 1)4
2(es − 1)4(es − a(s))4
− d
2
ǫ2
· s2 (b(s))
2e4s(es + 1)4
4(es − 1)4(es − a(s))4
+
d
ǫ
· s (1 − a(s))e
2s(es + 1)2
(es − 1)2(es − a(s))2
=
d2
ǫ2
· s2 (b(s))
2e4s(es + 1)4
4(es − 1)4(es − a(s))4
+
d
ǫ
· s (1− a(s))e
2s(es + 1)2
(es − 1)2(es − a(s))2 . (169)
Substituting b = a · es−1es into Eq. (169) yields
=
d2
ǫ2
· s2 (a(s))
2e2s(es + 1)4
4(es − 1)2(es − a(s))4
+
d
ǫ
· s (1− a(s))e
2s(es + 1)2
(es − 1)2(es − a(s))2 .
– If ǫ < ln 2, a = 0, b = 0, first-order derivative of
maxVar[Y [tj ]] is
maxVar[Y [tj ]]
′ =
d
ǫ
· (e
s + 1)(−4ses + e2s − 1)
(es − 1)3 .
(170)
When maxVar[Y [tj ]]
′ = 0, we have root s ≈ 2.18.
– If ln 2 < ǫ < ln 5.5, by numerical experiments, we
have optimal s ≈ 2.5.
– If ǫ ≥ ln 5.5, by numerical experiments, we have
optimal s ≈ 2.5.
Therefore, we pick s = 2.5 and k = ǫ2.5 to simplify the
experimental evaluation.

T. Extending Three-Outputs for Multiple Numeric At-
tributes
Lemma 14. For a d-dimensional numeric tuple x which is
perturbed as Y under ǫ-LDP, and for each tj of the d attribute,
the variance of Y [tj ] induced by Three-Outputs is
Var[Y [tj ]] =
d
k
(
(1 − a)e 2ǫk (e ǫk + 1)2
(e
ǫ
k − 1)2(e ǫk − a)2 +
b|x[tj ]|e 2ǫk (e ǫk + 1)2
(e
ǫ
k − 1)2(e ǫk − a)2
)
− (x[tj ])2.
Proof of Lemma 14. The variance of Y [tj ] is computed as
Var[Y [tj ]] = E[(Y [tj ])
2]− E[Y [tj ]]2
=
k
d
E[(
d
k
yj)
2]− (x[tj ])2
=
d
k
E[(yj)
2]− (x[tj ])2. (171)
We use variance Eq. (173) to compute
E[(yj)
2] = Var[yj ] + (E[yj ])
2
=
(1− a)e 2ǫk (e ǫk + 1)2
(e
ǫ
k − 1)2(e ǫk − a)2 +
b|x[tj ]|e 2ǫk (e ǫk + 1)2
(e
ǫ
k − 1)2(e ǫk − a)2 − (x[tj ])
2
+ (x[tj ])
2
=
(1− a)e 2ǫk (e ǫk + 1)2
(e
ǫ
k − 1)2(e ǫk − a)2 +
b|x[tj ]|e 2ǫk (e ǫk + 1)2
(e
ǫ
k − 1)2(e ǫk − a)2 .
Then,
Var[Y [tj ]] =
d
k
(
(1 − a)e 2ǫk (e ǫk + 1)2
(e
ǫ
k − 1)2(e ǫk − a)2 +
b|x[tj ]|e 2ǫk (e ǫk + 1)2
(e
ǫ
k − 1)2(e ǫk − a)2
)
− (x[tj ])2.

30
U. Proof of Lemma 11
Given PM-SUB’s variance in Eq. (139), we have
VarP [Y |x] =
(
1
1− 2Ad − 1
)
x2 +
2d
3
A3 +
(1− 2Ad)3
12(c− d)2 .
Substituting α = Ad yields
VarP [Y |x] =
(
1
1− 2α − 1
)
x2 +
2α
3d2
+
(1− 2α)3
12(c− d)2 .
In addition, substitute 1 − 2α = eǫ−1eǫ+t , d = t(e
ǫ−1)
2(t+eǫ)2 , ξ :=
c−d
d , ξ = e
ǫ − 1, α = t+12(t+eǫ) . Then, we have
VarP [Y |x] = t+ 1
eǫ − 1x
2 +
(t+ eǫ)
(
(t+ 1)3 + eǫ − 1)
3t2(eǫ − 1)2 .
(172)
Given Three-Outputs’s variance in Eq. (73), we can
simplify it as
VarT [Y |x] = (1− a)C2 + C2b|x| − x2.
According to Eq. (74), we have C = e
ǫ(eǫ+1)
(eǫ−1)(eǫ−a) , so that
VarT [Y |x] = (1 − a)e
2ǫ(eǫ + 1)2
(eǫ − 1)2(eǫ − a)2 +
b|x|e2ǫ(eǫ + 1)2
(eǫ − 1)2(eǫ − a)2 − x
2.
(173)
Based on Eq. (172) and Eq. (173), we can construct variance
of hybrid mechanism as follows
VarH[Y |x] = β( t+ 1
eǫ − 1x
2 +
(t+ eǫ)
(
(t+ 1)3 + eǫ − 1)
3t2(eǫ − 1)2 )+
(1− β)( (1 − a)e
2ǫ(eǫ + 1)2
(eǫ − 1)2(eǫ − a)2 +
b|x|e2ǫ(eǫ + 1)2
(eǫ − 1)2(eǫ − a)2 − x
2),
where t = eǫ/3.
From Eq. (74), we set b = a· eǫ−1eǫ to get the worst-case noise
variance. Then, we have variance of the hybrid mechanism as
VarH[Y |x] = (β t+ 1
eǫ − 1 + β − 1)x
2
+ (1− β) ae
ǫ(eǫ + 1)2
(eǫ − 1)(eǫ − a)2 |x|
+
(
(t+ eǫ)((t + 1)3 + eǫ − 1)
3t2(eǫ − 1)2 β
+ (1− β)(1 − a) e
2ǫ(eǫ + 1)2
(eǫ − 1)2(eǫ − a)2
)
, (174)
where t = eǫ/3. Based on Eq. (174), we get
max
x∈[−1,1]
VarH[Y |x] ={
VarH[Y |x∗], if β t+1eǫ−1 + β − 1 < 0, 0 < x∗ < 1,
max{VarH[Y |0],VarH[Y |1]}, otherwise,
(175)
where x∗ := (β−1)ae
ǫ(eǫ+1)2
2(eǫ−a)2(β(eǫ+t)−eǫ+1) .
Therefore, we have the following cases to compute
maxx∈[−1,1]VarH[Y |x]:
(I) If β t+1eǫ−1 + β − 1 < 0, 0 < Y < 1, we obtain:
– β < e
ǫ−1
eǫ+t ,
– For Y := (β−1)ae
ǫ(eǫ+1)2
2(eǫ−a)2(β(eǫ+t)−eǫ+1) , if 0 < Y < 1, we
have 0 < (β−1)ae
ǫ(eǫ+1)2
2(eǫ−a)2(β(eǫ+t)−eǫ+1) < 1.
If
(β−1)aeǫ(eǫ+1)2
2(eǫ−a)2(β(eǫ+t)−eǫ+1) < 1, we have :
β(2(eǫ − a)2(eǫ + t)− aeǫ(eǫ + 1)2) >
2(eǫ − a)2(eǫ − 1)− aeǫ(eǫ + 1)2. (176)
– If 2(eǫ − a)2(eǫ + t)− aeǫ(eǫ + 1)2 > 0, we have
β >
2(eǫ − a)2(eǫ − 1)− aeǫ(eǫ + 1)2
2(eǫ − a)2(eǫ + t)− aeǫ(eǫ + 1)2 .
– If 2(eǫ− a)2(eǫ + t)− aeǫ(eǫ + 1)2 = 0 and 2(eǫ−
a)2(eǫ − 1) − aeǫ(eǫ + 1)2 > 0, no β satisfies the
condition.
– If 2(eǫ− a)2(eǫ + t)− aeǫ(eǫ + 1)2 = 0 and 2(eǫ−
a)2(eǫ − 1) − aeǫ(eǫ + 1)2 ≤ 0, any β satisfies the
condition.
– If 2(eǫ − a)2(eǫ + t)− aeǫ(eǫ + 1)2 < 0, we have
β < 2(e
ǫ−a)2(eǫ−1)−aeǫ(eǫ+1)2
2(eǫ−a)2(eǫ+t)−aeǫ(eǫ+1)2 . Since β <
eǫ−1
eǫ+t , to get the correct domain, we com-
pare
2(eǫ−a)2(eǫ−1)−aeǫ(eǫ+1)2
2(eǫ−a)2(eǫ+t)−aeǫ(eǫ+1)2 and
eǫ−1
eǫ+t , see Ap-
pendix G, we have
2(eǫ−a)2(eǫ−1)−aeǫ(eǫ+1)2
2(eǫ−a)2(eǫ+t)−aeǫ(eǫ+1)2 ≤
eǫ−1
eǫ+t . Therefore, β <
2(eǫ−a)2(eǫ−1)−aeǫ(eǫ+1)2
2(eǫ−a)2(eǫ+t)−aeǫ(eǫ+1)2 .
Summarize above analysis, we have the following cases
to compute maxx∈[−1,1]VarH[Y |x] :
1) If 2(eǫ − a)2(eǫ + t)− aeǫ(eǫ + 1)2 > 0, we have:
max
x∈[−1,1]
VarH[Y |x] ={
VarH[Y |x∗], if 2(e
ǫ−a)2(eǫ−1)−aeǫ(eǫ+1)2
2(eǫ−a)2(eǫ+t)−aeǫ(eǫ+1)2 < β <
eǫ−1
eǫ+t ,
max{VarH[Y |0],VarH[Y |1]}, otherwise.
2) If 2(eǫ−a)2(eǫ+ t)−aeǫ(eǫ+1)2 = 0 and aeǫ(eǫ+
1)2 + 2(eǫ − a)2(1− eǫ) > 0, we have:
max
x∈[−1,1]
VarH[Y |x] = max{VarH[Y |0],VarH[Y |1]}
3) If 2(eǫ− a)2(eǫ + t)− aeǫ(eǫ + 1)2 = 0 and 2(eǫ−
a)2(eǫ − 1)− aeǫ(eǫ + 1)2 ≤ 0, we have:
max
x∈[−1,1]
VarH[Y |x] ={
VarH[Y |x∗], if β < eǫ−1eǫ+t ,
max{VarH[Y |0],VarH[Y |1]}, otherwise.
4) If 2(eǫ − a)2(eǫ + t)− aeǫ(eǫ + 1)2 < 0, we have:
max
x∈[−1,1]
VarH[Y |x] ={
VarH[Y |x∗], if β < 2(e
ǫ−a)2(eǫ−1)−aeǫ(eǫ+1)2
2(eǫ−a)2(eǫ+t)−aeǫ(eǫ+1)2 ,
max{VarH[Y |0],VarH[Y |1]}, otherwise.
Appendix H proves that
2(eǫ − a)2(eǫ + t)− aeǫ(eǫ + 1)2 > 0
and Appendix G
2(eǫ − a)2(eǫ − 1)− aeǫ(eǫ + 1)2
2(eǫ − a)2(eǫ + t)− aeǫ(eǫ + 1)2 ≤
eǫ − 1
eǫ + t
.
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Therefore, we have
max
x∈[−1,1]
VarH[Y |x] ={
VarH[Y |x∗], if 0 < β < 2(e
ǫ−a)2(eǫ−1)−aeǫ(eǫ+1)2
2(eǫ−a)2(eǫ+t)−aeǫ(eǫ+1)2 ,
max{VarH[Y |0],VarH[Y |1]}, otherwise.
(II) Based on above analysis, to makemaxx∈[−1,1]VarH[Y =
y|x] = max{VarH[Y |0],VarH[Y |1]}, β should satisfy
constraint
2(eǫ−a)2(eǫ−1)−aeǫ(eǫ+1)2
2(eǫ−a)2(eǫ+t)−aeǫ(eǫ+1)2 ≤ β ≤ 1.
To get the exact value of maxx∈[−1,1]VarH[Y |x], we
compare VarH[Y |1] and VarH[Y |0], values of VarH[Y |1]
and VarH[Y |0] are:
– VarH[Y |1] = (β t+1eǫ−1 + β − 1) + (1 −
β) ae
ǫ(eǫ+1)2
(eǫ−1)(eǫ−a)2+
( (t+eǫ)((t+1)3+eǫ−1)
3t2(eǫ−1)2 β+(1−β)(1−
a) e
2ǫ(eǫ+1)2
(eǫ−1)2(eǫ−a)2
)
= β
(
t+1
eǫ−1 + 1 − ae
ǫ(eǫ+1)2
(eǫ−1)(eǫ−a)2 +
(t+eǫ)((t+1)3+eǫ−1)
3t2(eǫ−1)2 − (1−a)e
2ǫ(eǫ+1)2
(eǫ−1)2(eǫ−a)2
) − 1 +
aeǫ(eǫ+1)2
(eǫ−1)(eǫ−a)2 +
(1−a)e2ǫ(eǫ+1)2
(eǫ−1)2(eǫ−a)2 ,
– VarH[Y |0] = (t+e
ǫ)((t+1)3+eǫ−1)
3t2(eǫ−1)2 β + (1 − β)(1 −
a) e
2ǫ(eǫ+1)2
(eǫ−1)2(eǫ−a)2 = β
( (t+eǫ)((t+1)3+eǫ−1)
3t2(eǫ−1)2 −
(1−a)e2ǫ(eǫ+1)2
(eǫ−1)2(eǫ−a)2
)
+ (1−a)e
2ǫ(eǫ+1)2
(eǫ−1)2(eǫ−a)2 .
Since VarH[Y |1] and VarH[Y |0] are linear equations
respect to β, we compare slopes of β in VarH[Y |1] and
VarH[Y |0]. We define the slope of β in VarH[Y |1] as
slope1 :=
t+ 1
eǫ − 1 + 1−
aeǫ(eǫ + 1)2
(eǫ − 1)(eǫ − a)2
+
(t+ eǫ)((t+ 1)3 + eǫ − 1)
3t2(eǫ − 1)2 −
(1− a)e2ǫ(eǫ + 1)2
(eǫ − 1)2(eǫ − a)2 ,
(177)
and the slope of β in VarH[Y |0] as
slope2 :=
(t+ eǫ)((t + 1)3 + eǫ − 1)
3t2(eǫ − 1)2 −
(1 − a)e2ǫ(eǫ + 1)2
(eǫ − 1)2(eǫ − a)2 .
(178)
Then, we represent left boundary of β as
β1 :=
2(eǫ − a)2(eǫ − 1)− aeǫ(eǫ + 1)2
2(eǫ − a)2(eǫ + t)− aeǫ(eǫ + 1)2 , (179)
and the right boundary of β as
β2 := 1, (180)
and the value of β at the intersection of slope1 and slope2
is
βintersection :=
(c− 1)(c− a)2 − ac(c+ 1)2
(t+ c)(c− a)2 − ac(c+ 1)2 . (181)
Then, slope1 and slope2 have the following possible com-
binations:
1) If slope1 > 0, slope2 > 0, β = β1.
2) If slope1 < 0, slope2 < 0, β = β2.
3) If slope1 · slope2 < 0, If β1 < βintersection < β2, β =
βintersection.
4) If slope1 · slope2 < 0, If ββintersection < β1 or
βintersection > β2, find β for min
{
max{Var[Y |1, β =
β1],Var[Y |0, β = β1]}
,max{Var[Y |1, β = β2],Var[Y |0, β = β2]}
}
.
5) If slope1 · slope2 = 0,
Case 1, slope1 = 0, slope2 6= 0,
a) If slope1 = 0, slope2 > 0, βintersection ∈ [β1, β2],
β = [β1, βintersection].
b) If slope1 = 0, slope2 < 0, βintersection ∈ [β1, β2],
β = [βintersection, β2].
c) If slope1 = 0, slope2 > 0, βintersection < β1
or βintersection > β2, VarH[Y |1, β = [β1, β2]] >
VarH[Y |0, β = [β1, β2]], β = [β1, β2].
d) If slope1 = 0, slope2 > 0, βintersection < β1
or βintersection > β2, VarH[Y |0, β = [β1, β2]] >
VarH[Y |1, β = [β1, β2]], β = β1.
e) If slope1 = 0, slope2 < 0, βintersection < β1
or βintersection > β2, VarH[Y |1, β = [β1, β2]] >
VarH[Y |0, β = [β1, β2]], β = [β1, β2].
f) If slope1 = 0, slope2 < 0, βintersection < β1
or βintersection > β2, VarH[Y |1, β = [β1, β2]] <
VarH[Y |0, β = [β1, β2]], β = β2.
Case 2, slope2 = 0, slope1 6= 0,
a) If slope1 > 0, slope2 = 0 , βintersection ∈ [β1, β2],
β = [β1, βintersection].
b) If slope1 < 0, slope2 = 0 , βintersection ∈ [β1, β2],
β = [βintersection, β2].
c) If slope2 = 0, slope1 > 0, βintersection < β1
or βintersection > β2, VarH[Y |1, β = [β1, β2]] >
VarH[Y |0, β = [β1, β2]], β = β1.
d) If slope2 = 0, slope1 > 0, βintersection < β1
or βintersection > β2, VarH[Y |0, β = [β1, β2]] >
VarH[Y |1, β = [β1, β2]], β = [β1, β2].
e) If slope2 = 0, slope1 < 0, βintersection < β1
or βintersection > β2, VarH[Y |1, β = [β1, β2]] >
VarH[Y |0, β = [β1, β2]], β = β2.
f) If slope2 = 0, slope1 < 0, βintersection < β1
or βintersection > β2, VarH[Y |1, β = [β1, β2]] <
VarH[Y |0, β = [β1, β2]], β = [β1, β2].
Case 3, slope1 = 0 and slope2 = 0,
a) If VarH[Y |1, β = [β1, β2]] < VarH[Y |0, β =
[β1, β2]], β = [β1, β2].
b) If VarH[Y |1, β = [β1, β2]] > VarH[Y |0, β =
[β1, β2]], β = [β1, β2].
c) If VarH[Y |1, β = [β1, β2]] = VarH[Y |0, β =
[β1, β2]], β = [β1, β2].
Proof. 1) If slope1 > 0, slope2 > 0, VarH[Y |1]
and VarH[Y |0] monotonically increase β ∈ [β1, β2],
minβ maxx∈[−1,1]VarH[Y |x] is at β = β1.
2) Similar to 1), we have minβ maxx∈[−1,1]VarH[Y |x] is
at β = 1.
3) If β1 < βintersection < β2, we have:
• If slope1 > 0, slope2 < 0, Var[Y |1] monotonically
increases and Var[Y |0]monotonically decreases, so when
β ∈ [β1, βintersection], maxx∈[−1,1]VarH[Y |x] =
VarH[Y |0]. When β ∈ [βintersection, β2],
maxx∈[−1,1]VarH[Y |x] = VarH[Y |1]. Therefore,
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minβ maxx∈[−1,1]VarH[Y |x] = VarH[Y |1] = VarH[Y |0]
at β = βintersection.
• If slope1 < 0, slope2 > 0, Var[Y |1] monotonically
decreases and Var[Y |0]monotonically increases, so when
β ∈ [β1, βintersection], maxx∈[−1,1]VarH[Y |x] =
VarH[Y |1]. When β ∈ [βintersection, β2],
maxx∈[−1,1]VarH[Y |x] = VarH[Y |0]. Therefore,
minβ maxx∈[−1,1]VarH[Y |x] = VarH[Y |1] = VarH[Y |0]
at β = βintersection.
4) If βintersection < β1 and β2 > βintersection, we have:
• If slope1 > 0, slope2 < 0 and VarH[Y |1] >
VarH[Y |0], since VarH[Y |1] monotonically increases
in the domain, minβ VarH[Y |1] is at β = β1.
minβ maxx∈[−1,1]VarH[Y |x] is at β = β1.
• If slope1 > 0, slope2 < 0 and VarH[Y |1] <
VarH[Y |0]. Since VarH[Y |0] monotonically decreases
in the domain, minβ VarH[Y |0] is at β = β2.
minβ maxx∈[−1,1]VarH[Y |x] is at β = β2.
• If slope1 < 0, slope2 > 0 and VarH[Y |1] >
VarH[Y |0],maxx∈[−1,1]VarH[Y |x] = VarH[Y |1],
since VarH[Y |1] monotonically decreases in
the domain, minβ VarH[Y |1] is at β = β2.
minβ maxx∈[−1,1]VarH[Y |x] is at β = β2.
• If slope1 < 0 , slope2 > 0 and VarH[Y |1] < VarH[Y |0],
maxx∈[−1,1]VarH[Y |x] = VarH[Y |0], since VarH[Y |0]
monotonically increases in the domain, minβ VarH[Y |0]
is at β = β1. minβ maxx∈[−1,1]VarH[Y |x] is at β = β1.
5)
• Case 1:
a) If slope1 = 0, slope2 > 0, βintersection ∈
[β1, β2], we can conclude that β ∈
[β1, βintersection],VarH[Y |1] > VarH[Y |0]. When
β ∈ (βintersection, β2],VarH[Y |0] > VarH[Y |1].
Since VarH[Y |0] monotonically increases if β ∈
(βintersection, β2], minβ maxx∈[−1,1]VarH[Y |x] =
VarH[Y |1, β = [β1, βintersection]].
b) If slope1 = 0, slope2 < 0, βintersection ∈
[β1, β2], we can conclude that β ∈
[β1, βintersection],VarH[Y |0] > VarH[Y |1].
When β ∈ (βintersection, β2],VarH[Y |1] >
VarH[Y |0]. Since VarH[Y |1] does not change
and VarH[Y |0] monotonically decreases,
minβ maxx∈[−1,1]VarH[Y |x] = VarH[Y |0, β =
[βintersection, β2]].
c) If slope1 = 0, slope2 > 0,VarH[Y |1, β = [β1, β2]] >
VarH[Y |0, β = [β1, β2]], the βintersection > β2.
Since VarH[Y |1] does not change if β ∈ [β1, β2],
minβ maxx∈[−1,1]VarH[Y |x] = VarH[Y |1, β =
[β1, β2]].
d) If slope1 = 0, slope2 > 0,VarH[Y |0, β = [β1, β2]] >
VarH[Y |1, β = [β1, β2]], the βintersection >
β2. Since VarH[Y |0] monotonically decreases if
β ∈ [β1, β2], minβ maxx∈[−1,1]VarH[Y |x] =
VarH[Y |0, β = β2].
e) If slope1 = 0, slope2 < 0,VarH[Y |1, β = [β1, β2]] >
VarH[Y |0, β = [β1, β2]], the βintersection < β1.
Since VarH[Y |1] does not change if β ∈ [β1, β||2],
minβ maxx∈[−1,1]VarH[Y |x] = VarH[Y |1, β =
[β1, β2]].
f) If slope1 = 0, slope2 < 0,VarH[Y |0, β = [β1, β2]] >
VarH[Y |1, β = [β1, β2]], the βintersection >
β2. Since VarH[Y |0] monotonically decreases if
β ∈ [β1, β2], minβ maxx∈[−1,1]VarH[Y |x] =
VarH[Y |0, β = β2].
• Case 2: The proof is similar to Case 1.
• Case 3: VarH[Y |0] and VarH[Y |1] are unchanged when
β ∈ [β1, β2]. Hence, minβ maxx∈[−1,1]VarH[Y |x] =
maxx∈[−1,1]VarH[Y |x, β = [β1, β2]].
